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Summary. Technological development has undeniably pervaded 
every aspect of our lives, and the ways in which we now use our 
identity related information has not escaped the impact of this 
change. We are increasingly called upon to adopt new technology, 
usually more through obligation than choice, to function in everyday 
society, and with this new era of supposed convenience has come 
new risks and challenges. In this chapter we examine the roots of 
identity management and the systems we use to support this activity, 
ways in which we can strive to keep our digital information secure 
such as Public Key encryption and digital signatures and the 
evolving yet somewhat controversial role of biometrics in identi-
fication and authentication. 
With an eye on the ever changing landscape of identity related 
technologies, we further explore emerging technologies which 
seem likely to impact on us in the near to mid-term future. These 
include RFID which has more recently come to the fore of the pub-
lic consciousness, Ambient Intelligence environments which offer 
convenience at the potential cost of privacy and human implants 
which surprisingly have already been developed in a medical con-
text and look set to be the next major step in our ever burgeoning 
relationship with technology.  
The field of high-tech Identity (high-tech ID) is immense and is rapidly expand-
ing because of developments in fundamental technologies. The evolution of 
technological mechanisms such as electronic ID cards, internet enabled devices 
and individualised services have arguable served to make our lives easier, and 
more efficient, and yet they risk leaving us more vulnerable in a variety of con-
texts. Understanding technologies which potentially have an impact on identity 
becomes increasingly important for a socially well developed and prosperous 
information society. 
In this chapter, the results of research carried out in the context of new and emerg-
ing technologies to support identity and identification are summarised. Because of 
its fundamental importance, one of the core research focuses was on Identity 
Management Systems (IMS) where the key research questions were: 
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• How is identity management carried out now and in the future? 
• What are the primary targets of identity management from the perspectives 
of the stakeholders involved? 
• What are relevant technological trends in identity management? 
• How should these technologies be put to use in identity management sys-
tems from a legal, technical (including privacy and data protection aspects) 
and a social point of view? 
Based on criteria developed, recommendations were elaborated that mainly address 
the following stakeholders: policy makers (public sector), enterprises (private sec-
tor), scientists and the general public (citizens and customers). In an early phase of 
the work an overview on relevant technologies in the context of IMS was created. 
Important technologies from the point of view of the FIDIS researchers were: 
• Technologies for a centralised identity management such as directory ser-
vices, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), biometrics (Section 4.2), technologies 
for mobile identity management (see Chapter 5), chip or smart card technol-
ogy (Meints and Hansen, 2006: 15-18) and RFID (Section 4.2.4) 
• Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD, see Chapter 7) 
• Technologies for a user-controlled identity management such as credential 
systems (see Section 4.2.5), anonymisation services, and various functions 
for user-controlled identity management including related commercially or 
freely available solutions  
• Supporting technologies such as Trusted Computing (TC), Digital Rights 
Management (DRM), networking protocols and protocols for privacy policy 
languages (see Section 4.3) 
• Emerging technologies (see Section 4.4). 
The criteria developed were also applied to real-life implementations of identity 
management systems. Focal areas of research were various implementations of 
data mining and RFID systems, biometric systems and others. In the context of 
this chapter two selected use cases will be discussed: CardSpace and ID docu-
ments (see Section 4.5). 
4.1 Identity Management and Identity Management 
Systems1 
As shown in Chapter 2, concepts of identity show a wide range. The same applies 
also to the term ‘identity management’. In a general sense identity management is 
                                                          
1 Author: Martin Meints, Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Hol-
stein (ICPP). 
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understood as ‘management of partial identities of a person’ (Pfitzmann and Hansen, 
2008) or ‘management of digital identities or digital identity data’ (Bauer, 
Meints, Hansen, 2005: 13). From a legal point of view this may apply as well to 
natural as legal persons. In the context of FIDIS both aspects have been researched. 
In this chapter the focus clearly is put on natural persons and related identities. A 
number of different activities carried out by different entities are summarised un-
der the term identity management, e.g., (Bauer, Meints, Hansen, 2005; Buitelaar, 
Meints, van Alsenoy, 2008 etc.): 
• Assignment or linking of (context specific) identifiers to a physical person 
• Identification, authentication, authorisation and access control in the context 
of applications, IT resources and physical environment (buildings, rooms etc.) 
• Management of life cycles of the identity of a physical person (e.g., enrol-
ment and assignment of roles and rights, use or execution of assigned roles 
and rights, changes in roles and rights, de-enrolment etc. 
• Aggregation and linking of attributes of a group of persons (group profiling) 
or individuals (individual profiling) from one or more sources, the use of 
profiles, e.g. by categorising or classifying individuals 
• The application of pseudonymisation and anonymisation techniques 
• The use of partial identities by an individual in various communicational 
contexts including role specific assignment and use of pseudonyms 
In a general sense Identity Management Systems (IMS) are understood as technical 
systems supporting the process of management of (partial) identities. So far this term 
is used quite broadly in many different domains (e.g., economy, public administra-
tion, science) describing different technologies (how is the identity managed) used 
in different ways (who manages which identities). Examples range from centralised 
directory based solutions for organisations, organisations spanning federation frame-
works, application of profiling practice and corresponding tools up to user centric 
and user controlled approaches and frameworks. Until 2004, to the knowledge of the 
author, no classification or typology was available helping to structure IMS. 
To facilitate further analysis of existing IMS in the context of FIDIS research, 
three basic types of IMS were identified and described (Bauer, Meints, Hansen, 
2005). In this model the aspect of control (control by an organisation or the user 
concerned), and methods used for the identity management (central account man-
agement, profiling techniques or user-centric methods) were covered. This re-
sulted in the following typology: 
1. Type 1: IMS for account management, implementing authentication, authori-
sation, and accounting 
2. Type 2: IMS for profiling of user data by an organisation, e.g., detailed log 
files or data warehouses which support e.g., personalised services or the 
analysis of customer behaviour 
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3. Type 3: IMS for user-controlled context-dependent role and pseudonym 
management. 
This typology maps nicely with the tiers of identity introduced by Durand (Sec-
tion 2.3.2), though independent development leads to a missing map of numbers 
used in both models. Tier 1 identity (according to Durand, the personal or chosen 
identity) can be understood as a result from type 3 identity management (user-
controlled identity management). Tier 2 identity (corporate or assigned identity) is 
a result of type 1 identity management (organisation centric identity management), 
and tier 3 identity (marketing or derived identity) results from type 2 identity man-
agement (profiling). Fig. 4.1. summarises major properties of these types of IMS. 
In addition it was researched which role identity management functionality 
plays in products investigated. In this context a classification was developed: 
1. Class 1: Main functionality of the product is identity management (example: 
directory services) 
2. Class 2: Identity management is an important function; nevertheless the 
product also offers additional functionality (example: the Hushmail mail 
system for encrypted communication) 
3. Class 3: The core of the product is not focused on identity management; 
however, identity management functionality is included (example: web 
browsers) 
Type 1 
 
Account  
Management:  
assigned identity 
By organisations 
Type 2 
 
Profiling:  
derived identity By organisations 
Type 3 
 
Management of own 
identities: chosen identity
By users themselves, 
supported by service 
providers 
Fig. 4.1. Types of IMS 
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A number of such identity management systems have been analysed and observed 
over three years in a publicly accessible identity management database2. It should 
be noted that implementations of IMS can also be of hybrid types combining dif-
ferent organisational structures and methods characterising the introduced types. 
Examples for hybrid types are credential systems (focus: type 3 identity manage-
ment) in which trusted third parties are involved (type 1 identity management).  
From a market point of view in the context of type 1 identity management sys-
tems a concentration was observed. Many of the products investigated based on a 
study (Hansen et al., 2003) commissioned by the Institute for Prospective Tech-
nology Studies (IPTS) were taken over by competitors on the market. Currently 
the market for class 3 IMS seems to be growing rapidly. One example for this 
trend is the development on the market for social networks (see also Chapter 2); 
most of them do not have social networking as an economic core and gain their 
revenue through other activities, mainly market research and advertising. 
4.2 Technologies and Technical Components 
In this section established core technologies in the context of identity management 
are described. The focus concentrates on high technologies, especially those re-
lated to computer technologies and computer science. Technologies covered in 
this chapter are: 
• Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)  
• Electronic signatures 
• Biometrics 
• Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
• Credential Systems 
The description includes an introduction into functional principles of the tech-
nologies, properties, strengths and weaknesses with respect to identity manage-
ment, and recommendations for the application in the context of identity manage-
ment systems. 
4.2.1 Public Key Infrastructure3 
Cryptography can be used to provide secrecy of message contents or to provide 
integrity and accountability of messages. One of the most fundamental principles 
of modern cryptography was defined by Auguste Kerckhoffs (1883) and is now 
known as Kerckhoffs’ principle: ‘The security provided by a given cryptographic 
                                                          
2 See http://imsdb.fidis.net/. 
3 Authors: Stefan Köpsell and Stefan Berthold, TU Dresden. 
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algorithm should not depend on the secrecy of the algorithm itself, but on the se-
crecy of cryptographic keys.’ 
Talking about secrecy of cryptographic keys in relation to communicating par-
ties and their knowledge, one can distinguish between cryptographic algorithms 
which use symmetric keys and algorithms which use asymmetric ones. The terms 
‘symmetric’ and ‘asymmetric’ refer respectively to the knowledge related to the 
keys: In the first case it is symmetric, i.e., both communicating parties know ex-
actly the same key. This key is used for encryption as well as decryption. In the 
case of an asymmetric algorithm, each party has its own secret decryption key and 
a publicly known encryption key. Therefore the knowledge with respect to the 
keys is asymmetric between the parties. 
One of the biggest obstructions from an organisational and usability point of 
view of modern cryptographic algorithms and protocols is the burden of key dis-
tribution. If one wants to use symmetric algorithms, this is more obvious as a 
trustworthy (i.e., secure) channel is needed for the transportation of the secret keys. 
But even in the case of asymmetric cryptography where public keys are used and 
therefore no concealed channel is necessary, one still faces the problem of integ-
rity and accountability when distributing keys. 
Public key infrastructures (PKIs) are a basic approach to solving these prob-
lems. Using PKIs, public keys are reliably assigned to persons by means of digital 
signatures and a certification authority (CA). A certification authority is an organisa-
tion or institution which accredits that a given public key belongs to a given entity. 
The entity is usually a human being but could also be a machine, e.g., a web-server. 
The assignments are also known as (digital) key certificates. These certificates are 
digitally signed by the certification authority. Figure 4.2 exemplifies the basic 
functionality of a PKI. 
A typical use case for digital key certificates is to link a certain public key to an 
entity named within the certificate with its real identity, i.e., using the real name 
and not a pseudonym. But it is also possible to issue digital key certificates for 
pseudonyms. In this case the certification authority in fact knows the real name of 
the entity for which it issued a pseudonymous key certificate. This way the CA 
can reveal the true identity if necessary, e.g., if required by law.  
Another type of certificates is the so-called attribute certificate, which binds a 
set of arbitrary attributes to an entity. Thus it can be seen as a generalised form of 
a digital key certificate as the public key can be seen simply as an attribute of the 
related entity.  
 In order to verify a digital certificate, one needs to know the public key of the 
certification authority. One possibility is to get this public key from another certi-
fication authority B which accredits the public key of certification authority A. 
Thus the relations between certification authorities form a hierarchical tree. The 
topmost element is called a root certification authority (Root CA). The tree could 
be used for implicit trust management, i.e., an application could define that it ac-
cepts all certificates which are directly signed by a certain certification authority B 
(e.g., the root certification authority) or subsequently signed by a certification 
authority A which has a certificate signed by B. Note that the very root of this tree  
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Fig. 4.2. Basic functionality of a certification authority4  
is not authenticated by means of cryptography. Instead the integrity and validity of 
the root certificate has to be checked manually, e.g., by comparing the hash value 
of that certificate with a publicly known value which could be published in news 
papers or governmental communications, i.e., via a different channel. 
One weakness in this hierarchical concept is the large tree of implicit trust it 
spans. This becomes more obvious if one considers that different certification 
authorities might have slightly different policies with respect to the steps required 
before the CA will sign a certificate. One CA might demand an official document 
proving the identity of the key owner before it signs the certificate while other 
CAs might not. To give just one example, in January 2001 the company VeriSign 
Inc.—one of the world’s leading CAs—issued two digital certificates to a person 
who fraudulently claimed to be a representative of Microsoft Corporation. The 
issued certificates allowed the person to sign software in the name of Microsoft5. 
Another weak point of current PKIs is the way they deal with revocation. Cer-
tificates may get lost due to accidents or burglary, for instance. The common way 
is to provide a certificate revocation list (CRL) in order to keep every user in-
formed about the validity of certificates. The distribution of such CRLs, however, 
requires users of PKIs to be online and up-to-date whenever they intend to use a 
certificate since they would need to check it before usage. This is quite inconven-
                                                          
4 Figure taken from Pfitzmann (2008). 
5 http://www.verisign.com/support/advisories/authenticodefraud.html. 
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ient since PKIs without revocation would not require the user to be online. In fact, 
there are several approaches to improve the distribution of certificates and trust 
chains. However, there is yet no improvement for the distribution of CRLs which 
is significantly better than broadcast. 
One measure to bind the size of a revocation list is to limit the validity of a 
given certificate to a certain period of time (typically one or two years). This va-
lidity period is encoded in each digital certificate. But as now digital certificates 
can become outdated, one has to renew them from time to time. This implies addi-
tional effort for the users of digital certificates. 
All these processes—the registration process, to take care of the revocation list 
and to renew certificates—cause costs which needs to be covered by the users of a 
certification authority if this authority is operated by a private company. Therefore 
the users typically have to pay an annual fee. Naturally this is a disadvantage of 
PKIs—especially if the benefits of using them will not overcompensate the costs. 
From a practical point of view there are even more problems which are related 
to interoperability, although there exists a whole series of standards related to 
public key infrastructures. In 1988 the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU-T) published the X.509 standard titled ‘The Directory: Public-key and at-
tribute certificate frameworks’ within their X.500 information technology-related 
standards which focus on open systems interconnection. Most digital certificates 
today conform to the current version 3 of the X.509 standard. This version intro-
duces extensibility by means of profiles. One of the (if not the) most important 
profile is developed by the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) working group of 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), called PKIX. The goal of this work-
ing group, which was established in 1995, is to develop standards for a public key 
infrastructure to be used on the Internet. The group produces more than 40 so-
called ‘Requests For Comments (RFCs)’—they are effectively Internet standards. 
Not only is the ‘correct’ implementation of all these standards a hard task—as 
there is always room for interpretation—but also the inherent flexibility and ex-
tensibility of X.509 supports application- or domain-specific extensions which 
hinder global interoperability. 
4.2.2 Electronic Signatures6 
For high-tech IDs, there are roughly two relevant standard applications of elec-
tronic signatures defined in Article 2 of the EU directive 1999/93/EC, the ad-
vanced signature and the qualified electronic signature. An exhaustive discussion 
of these signature types with respect to requirements, legal effects, and their pro-
bative value can be found in (Gasson, Meints, Warwick, 2005: 26). In this section, 
we focus on the main differences between advanced and qualified electronic sig-
natures and their relation to PKIs. 
An advanced electronic signature is, according to the EU directive 1999/93/EC7, 
an electronic signature with four requirements:  
                                                          
6 Authors: Stefan Köpsell and Stefan Berthold, TU Dresden. 
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• it is uniquely linked to the signatory;  
• it is capable of identifying the signatory;  
• it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole 
control; and  
• it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subse-
quent change of the data is detectable.  
Even though the legal effectiveness of advanced electronic signatures is limited for 
business, it still creates a unique link between the signed data and the signatory. 
Of more interest for business cases are qualified electronic signatures. The va-
lidity of qualified electronic signatures is based on a qualified certificate, which is 
basically a digital certificate issued by a certification authority. A certification 
authority can be conceived as the root of a PKI or as a subsequent authority within 
a PKI certification tree. In the latter case, the PKI certification tree is used to dele-
gate the permission to issue certificates from the root CA to a subsequent certifica-
tion authority, see ‘Public Key Infrastructure’ in Section 4.2.1. Such permission can 
be limited in order to achieve a separation of duties between several subsequent 
certification authorities. In addition to the necessary qualified certificate, qualified 
electronic signatures are required to be created by a ‘secure-signature-creation de-
vice’. This type of signature has legal effects comparable to a hand-written signa-
ture, as defined in Article 5 of 1999/93/EC. 
Technically, electronic signatures can be seen as the counterpart of asymmetric 
encryption schemes. That is, there is a secret key for signing a message and a pub-
lic key for verifying. In contrast to message authentication codes, electronic signa-
tures can be used to convince third parties of the authenticity of a message, since 
the signing key is secret and must not to be shared by the sender with anyone else. 
The basic principles of generating and verifying an electronic signature are de-
picted in Figure 4.3. 
An electronic signature is generated by first applying a hash function to the 
message and afterwards using the core signature algorithm to sign just the result-
ing hash value. Note that for electronic signatures to be secure, both parts—the 
hash function and the core signature algorithm—need to be uncompromised and 
work properly. 
From a technical point of view the requirements of advanced and qualified 
electronic signatures induce some (controversially discussed) challenges and prob-
lems. Of special importance are two requirements on a secure-signature-creation 
device, ‘the signature-creation-data used for signature generation can be protected 
in a reliable way by the legitimate signatory against the use of others’ and ‘secure 
signature-creation devices must not alter the data to be signed or prevent such data 
from being presented to the signatory prior to the signature process.’ Both re-
quirements are hard to assure with current technology. Today’s standard PCs with  
                                                          
7 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:013:0012:0020: 
EN:PDF. 
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Fig. 4.3. Digital signature system8 
standard operating system cannot be used as secure signature-creation devices. 
Given all the security weaknesses of PCs they can neither ensure that ‘the signa-
ture-creation-data used for signature generation can be reliably protected’ nor 
‘what I sign is what I see’. Therefore specialised hardware and software is needed, 
e.g. external card readers. Such devices need at least a means for input to authorise 
the signing process and a display (or other means of output) to inform the user 
about what he will sign. So from an organisational and usability point of view 
electronic signatures are slightly impractical and costly. 
In addition to the problem of achieving the previous two requirements, an ad-
vanced electronic signature is required to be ‘created using means that the signa-
tory can maintain under his sole control’. Then, the problem is that the secret keys 
used for signing are typically created by certification authorities, not by the users 
themselves. Thus, a user can never be sure of having the process of signing ‘under 
his sole control’. 
4.2.3 Biometrics9 
Biometrics is defined as the automated recognition of individuals based on their 
biological and / or behavioural characteristics. Typical examples for suitable bio-
logical characteristics used in biometric systems are fingerprints, iris filament 
structures or face forms. Recognition of hand written signatures or gesture dy-
namics are examples for behavioural characteristics. Any biometric system in-
                                                          
8 Figure taken from Pfitzmann (2008). 
9 Authors: Els Kindt, KU Leuven, Lorenz Müller, Axionics and Martin Meints, Unabhän-
giges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein. 
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cludes a measurement process that allows defining a query template with for-
malised features of the measured characteristics. These results are then com-
pared with a reference template that has been acquired when the individual en-
rols into the biometrically secured system.  
All suitable characteristics for biometrics have some mandatory qualities like 
universality (all persons have the characteristics), distinctiveness (every person 
has a different specificity of the characteristics), permanence (the characteristic is 
sufficiently invariant over a long time period) and collect ability (the characteris-
tics can be physically measured on all individuals). There are some additional 
desired qualities like separability (the difference between individuals is much 
larger than typical measurement errors), performance (the measurement of the 
biometric characteristic is robust, fast, accurate and efficient), acceptance (indi-
viduals accept the measurement process) and reliability (the characteristics and the 
usual measurement are difficult to counterfeit).  
Biometrics as Authentication Factor 
Biometric recognition of individuals is a suitable method to establish a strong link 
between a person and an identity. It has the advantage that it is difficult for the 
concerned individual but also for potential impostors to manipulate this binding. 
This broad protection even against insider attacks differentiates biometrics from 
other authentication factors like token or knowledge based methods such as PINs 
or passwords. On the other hand, a biometric link between an individual and some 
identity-related data is difficult to revoke even if there are good and legal reasons 
to do so. Most of the biometric characteristics are stable for a long time in the 
lifespan of an individual, much longer than typical business relationships. There-
fore a widespread use of biometrics for identity management in civil or business 
applications may expose a person to extensive profiling and thus seriously harm 
her right to privacy.  
Biometric Recognition Process 
All biometric systems have some common main functional components in a typi-
cal processing chain. These components are (see Figure 4.4):  
• a storage entity with the biometric data samples (reference templates) of 
the enrolled individual that is linked to or integrated in a database with the 
identity information of the corresponding individual 
• a sensor device and some pre-processing to capture the biometric data 
sample from an individual as input data 
• a comparison process that evaluates the similarity between the reference 
templates and the captured data sample and that results in a similarity score  
• a decision function that decides if a data sample matches a certain reference 
template. 
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The result is the approval or refusal of a mapping of the captured template to the 
identity information that belongs to the selected reference template. 
Biometric Recognition Quality 
Another important point is the fact that any biometric technique includes a physi-
cal measurement, which is intrinsically error-prone. Therefore the comparison 
between the query sample data and the reference template will normally not lead 
to an exact match but to a similarity score. Using this score value the system then 
has to decide if the query and the reference template are both coming from the 
same individual or not. This decision is based on probability estimates. Therefore 
a biometric recognition process can lead to false results in the sense that the 
authorised individual is rejected (False Rejection Rate—FRR) or that an impostor 
is accepted (False Acceptance Rate—FAR). The relative and absolute rates of 
such intrinsic errors in function of the threshold setting on the similarity score are 
the quality characteristics of a biometric system. These error rates depend on the  
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Fig. 4.4. The main processing components of a biometric system 
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Fig. 4.5. Receiver operating characteristics curve of a typical biometric system that shows the 
correlation between the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and the False Rejection Rate (FRR) 
chosen characteristic, on the technical realisation of the biometric system and on 
the decision threshold setting. The two error rates are strongly negatively corre-
lated and the overall quality of a biometric system is represented by the correlation 
plot called ROC (Receiver Operation Characteristics) curve that emerges when the 
threshold setting is changed over the full range of possible similarity scores (see 
Figure 4.5). A simplified form of this quality representation is the Equal Error 
Rate (EER). This single value represents the error rate of the FRR and the FAR 
when both values are equal.  
Operation Phases and Modes 
All biometric systems run in two separate processing phases. For each individual 
that shall be recognised by a biometric system first an initialisation procedure, 
called enrolment, takes place. In this processing phase the individual subject pro-
vides samples of a biometric characteristic to establish a new so called reference 
template. After the enrolment, the subject is known by the biometric system. In the 
subsequent query phase, the subject provides when requested a new biometric data 
sample called a query template. This query template is processed and compared 
with the saved reference templates of all enrolled subjects (identification mode) or 
with the saved template of a specified subject that claims a certain identity (verifi-
cation mode). The output of the system may be a simple yes / no, or an identity 
credential with identity information about the subject for a system that operates in 
the verification mode, or a list of identity data that correspond to the best matches 
(comparison scores) for a system running in identification mode. 
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Legal Aspects 
The privacy aspects of biometric systems and technologies have been widely dis-
cussed and, at least on the European level, have over all been well agreed.10 FIDIS 
research has pointed out various privacy risks of the implementation of the tech-
nology as well.11 These risks include the massive data collection in and outside 
Europe, hereby creating a global surveillance infrastructure, the risk of ‘repurpos-
ing’ of the collected data as past experience has already learned, the increasing 
chances for identity theft, unobserved authentication, direct identify ability and 
linkability, and unrestrained monitoring and profiling12 of individuals. Increasing 
the security in identification or authentication systems with the use of biometrics 
however does not necessarily mean that the privacy and data protection rights of 
the individuals concerned should decrease. The processing of biometric character-
istics of individuals is in principle subject to Article 8 of the Convention for the 
Protection on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the right to respect for 
one’s private life) and Directive 95/46/EC which provides the general legal 
framework for the processing of personal data. The Directive, however, does not 
mention biometric data as such. The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has 
therefore issued specific guidelines for the processing of biometric data in a work-
ing document of August 2003 (Art29DPWP, 2003), also see (Gasson, Meints, 
Warwick, 2005: 98-101) and (Kindt and Müller, 2007: 77-82). These guidelines 
include that (i) ‘raw’ biometric data shall not be stored because such data may 
reveal information about a person’s health or race, (ii) templates should preclude 
the processing of data that is not necessary, (iii) central storage of biometric data 
is to be avoided, (iv) the use of unique identifiers should be avoided by the ma-
nipulation of the templates, (v) other personal information should be segregated 
from the biometric information, and (vi) the controller shall take all appropriate 
technical and organisational security measures to protect the biometric data.13 
National Data Protection Authorities, including those of Belgium, France, Greece 
and the Netherlands, have also issued opinions on the use of biometric systems, in 
general or in specific situations.  
However, not all privacy concerns have been resolved. There is for example the 
uncertainty whether or not privacy-critical information for example concerning 
health can be extracted from templates, as this has not been thoroughly investi-
gated (Kindt and Müller, 2007: 83-87). There is also the risk of biometric data 
becoming a primary key for the interoperability of systems. The inappropriate 
                                                          
10 The specific privacy concerns for biometrics have been outlined in various documents and 
opinions, including Council of Europe, Progress report on the application of the principles 
of convention 108 to the collection and processing of biometric data, Strasbourg, February 
2005, 26 p. 
11 In this first reference the use of biometrics for the enhancement of PKI also was exten-
sively researched. 
12 See also Hildebrandt and Gutwirth (2008). 
13 On each of these principles, further explanation can be found in Gasson, Meints, War-
wick (2005: 101-105). 
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security architecture for the storage of biometric data in the Machine Readable 
Travel Document (MRTD) has also been argued and demonstrated in a dedicated 
FIDIS deliverable (Meints and Hansen, 2006: 160) and was subject of the Buda-
pest Declaration of the FIDIS research community.14 
Control Models for the Operation of a Biometric System 
Biometric systems can be understood as information and communication technol-
ogy (ICT) systems (or parts thereof). From a security point of view control in ICT 
systems is an important prerequisite for effective security. In this context a classi-
fication has already been developed (Rannenberg, Pfitzmann, Müller, 1999): 
• Centralised control in one organisation 
• Distributed control in a group of trusted organisations following homoge-
neous and mutually accepted security targets (mainly developed in one 
joint and shared security concept) 
• Distributed control with differing security targets, also called multilateral 
security. This model is especially of interest as research approaches for its 
implementation and no real-life implementations exist yet. 
Based on these categories, taking relevant stakeholders in the operation and use of 
today’s biometric systems (public and private sector, citizens and consumer) and 
relevant purposes together with the analysis of legal ground for the operation into 
consideration a typology of biometric systems was developed (Kindt and Müller, 
2007: 55-67): 
1. Type 1: Government controlled ID model;  
based on legal grounds, a group of organisations is running the biometric 
system either based on commonly agreed security targets or multilaterally; 
examples are the epass or biometrics enabled national ID cards 
2. Type 2: Access control model;  
based on the consent of the user, the system is run by private or public sec-
tor organisations centralised or distributed; examples are pay per touch and 
access control systems for public and private buildings, one particular set-
ting in this category is the shared control between the organisation and the 
biometric subject (see below ‘encapsulated biometrics’) 
3. Type 3: Mixed model;  
mainly based on consent, biometric data is shared between private and pub-
lic organisations (distributed control), but mainly common security targets 
exist; example: PRIVIUM (biometrics enabled border control) 
                                                          
14 FIDIS, Budapest Declaration on Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTD), Sep-
tember 2006, available at http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/press/budapest_declara-
tion_on_MRTD.en.20061106.pdf. 
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4. Type 4: Convenience model;  
based on consent, biometric data is either controlled by the user directly or 
shared with a service provider. Control can be centralised (at the user or the 
service provider) or distributed (from the service provider to the users); ex-
amples are biometric access control for private notebooks or the admini-
stration of school meals or books in libraries 
5. Type 5: Surveillance model;  
based on legal grounds (public sector) or consent (private sector), biometric 
data is used centralised or distributed for surveillance purposes, mostly in the 
context of public security or fraud and theft prevention (private sector); 
examples are CCTV-based biometric systems at public places or private 
property.  
Specific Risks for and Through Biometric Systems 
These concerns point towards the need for an appropriate legal framework, in 
additional to privacy-enhancing biometric solutions. 
In the context of biometric systems a number of risks have been discussed for 
operators and users. They are mainly (e.g., Meints and Hansen, 2006:105-115): 
• Identity takeover or usurpations (generally called ‘identity theft’; see also 
Chapter 8). 
• Violation of purpose binding by use of additional information in biometric 
data or use of the biometric data for purposes other than the original pur-
poses for which the data were collected (also called function creep). 
• Violation of purpose binding is especially eased through the fact that bio-
metric data can not be anonymised; the linkability of biometric characteris-
tics to a person is a central functional principle of biometrics. Linkability of 
biometric data to other sources of data increases the risk of profiling to the 
disadvantage of the user of biometric systems. 
• Violation of informational self determination by forcing users into the use 
of biometric systems where no legal ground for their use is in place.  
• As biometric systems can be run hidden they may be used, and without 
proper legal grounds abused, for non-recognised and non-interactive au-
thentication, tracking and surveillance purposes. On the other hand this fea-
ture of biometric systems includes them into the enablers of Ambient Intel-
ligence (AmI). 
• Improperly used biometric systems may lead to devaluation of established 
forensic methods. 
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Technical and Organisational Security Measures 
Technical and organisational security measures need to meet criteria defined as 
‘state-of-the-art’. This can be achieved based on relevant standards for informa-
tion security management systems such as the ISO/IEC 27000 series and CobiT15. 
On a product level, Common Criteria (CC, ISO/IEC 15408) can be used to counter 
general risks for identity management systems. The Biometric Evaluation Method-
ology for Common Criteria16 covers especially threats in the context of deliberate 
attacks on biometric systems. In this context the following aspects seem to be 
especially relevant: 
• Protective measures against theft of reference data in biometric systems. It 
has already been demonstrated that reference data in template formats can 
be used to reconstruct reference data to spoof sensors applying a so-called 
hill climbing attack (e.g., Hill, 2001; Adler, 2003). In a hill-climbing attack 
reference data is recalculated from templates in iterative cycles using, e.g., 
the match score of the system to evaluate the quality of the calculated data 
after each calculation cycle. To hamper hill-climbing attacks the biometric 
system should not return any match scores. 
• Protective measures against infiltration of biometric systems with unau-
thorised reference data need to be taken. 
• Detection measures for the use of copies of biometric characteristics (anti-
spoofing measures for sensors are especially important as the successful 
use of copies of characteristics has been demonstrated with many sensor 
types17); additional data collected in this context must not be used for pur-
poses other than security. 
• Physical (environmental) protection of as many parts of biometric systems 
as possible and effective access control measures on all levels of the system 
(physical access control, effective login and data access procedures); this 
also should include the deactivation of interfaces of the system not needed 
to prevent sensor override attacks18. 
• Assurance of the authenticity of biometric reference data via appropriate 
organisational and / or technical measures in the enrolment phase. 
• Logging of transactions and appropriate auditing of logs in biometric sys-
tems, especially of configuration parameters such as changes of thresholds. 
                                                          
15 The Control Objective for Information and Related Technology (CobiT) are available at 
http://www.isaca.org. 
16 See http://www.cesg.gov.uk/site/ast/biometrics/media/BEM_10.pdf. 
17 See, e.g., Geradts and Sommer (2006). 
18 Sensor override attacks are described by, e.g., Heinz, Krißler, Rütten (2007). 
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• Inclusion of relevant stakeholders when biometric systems are introduced 
or modified (release management). Relevant stakeholders may be for ex-
ample representatives of the works counsels, the information security offi-
cer and the data protection officer. 
• When buying or outsourcing parts or the whole biometric system, corre-
sponding service level agreements and security service levels need to be 
included in the contracts. An important part of these service levels is a 
control or auditing and enforcement strategy (e.g., via fines or discipli-
nary actions). 
Technical and Organisational Data Protection Measures 
From a data protection point of view the control model used for sensor and refer-
ence data is of interest. In some cases Data Protection Commissions in European 
member countries decided that for convenience driven applications the use of 
central reference data repositories under control of the service provider was not 
proportionate (e.g., Kindt, 2007). Alternatively reference data can be stored under 
the control of the data subject (e.g., using a token) or it can be encrypted with a 
key under control of the data subject. From a data protection point of view the 
control model implemented in encapsulated biometrics is currently the best. En-
capsulated biometric systems integrate sensors, matching systems and reference 
data storage in one device under control of the user of the biometric system. This 
device reports only a match or non-match (Kindt and Müller, 2007). Characteris-
tics or reference data in this case are not transferred to systems outside this device. 
This concept will be further described and evaluated in the next section. In any 
case it should be evaluated with care whether identification and thus a centralised 
reference data repository is really needed. 
Another important aspect is hindrance of linkability of biometric reference data. 
This can be achieved, e.g., by storing biometric reference data separately from other 
personal data, keeping it fragmented and encrypting these fragments with different 
keys. The application of template protection measures (see, e.g., Jain, Nandakumar, 
Nagar, 2008) or the use of biometric encryption (Cavoukian and Stoianov, 2007) 
also can hinder linkability as well as decentralised storage of reference data under 
control of the user.  
Biometric characteristics are, in difference to other factors of authentication, 
non-revocable. To hinder identity theft based on reference data schemes for revo-
cable reference data (see, e.g., Cavoukian and Stoianov, 2007; Zhou et al., 2007) 
should be used.  
Biometric raw data (mainly images of faces, finger tips, voice recordings etc.), 
data used for liveness detection and supposedly in some cases also templates con-
tain information in addition to the characteristics needed for the biometric match-
ing. In some cases this data is health or racial origin related and thus belongs to 
the special categories of personal data as defined in the European Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC (Kindt and Müller, 2007: 83-87). For this reason reference 
data should be especially protected against unauthorised access and use. In some 
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European countries (e.g., Luxemburg, Belgium etc.) prior checking of planned 
biometric systems by Data Protection Officers or Commissioners is recommended 
or required. To reduce additional information in biometric reference data, tem-
plates should be used instead of raw biometric data. 
In many cases the implementation of biometric systems in Europe requires con-
sent by the users (data subjects). In this context transparency among others about 
the data used and the procedures used in processing need to be described under-
standably to the user. In this context the three layer approach for privacy policies 
suggested by the Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party (Art29DPWP, 2004) may 
be useful. Important instruments to support trust in biometric systems’ security 
and privacy are information system management (ISO/IEC 27001) and Common 
Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408 including Biometrics Evaluation Methodology) certifi-
cates as well as privacy seals19. When biometric systems are introduced based on 
consent as a general rule a non-biometric back up procedure is required as users 
may opt out at any time.  
Encapsulated Biometrics—a Privacy-Enhanced Operation Mode 
A biometric comparison is far more complex than a password or PIN code check. 
It always includes a physical measurement process to capture a query template. 
Biometric authentication systems therefore all need some locally installed infra-
structure to which the subject needs physical access. This fact constrains the pos-
sible architectures of biometric systems. It is not possible to concentrate all proc-
esses in a physical completely secured environment; there are always points with 
immediate interaction with the outside world. 
Today’s biometric systems often work within architectures with entirely or par-
tially centrally controlled components. The server or the server controlled periph-
erals collect biometric data from the individuals through the local capture devices. 
The further processing is done under the sole control of a centralised biometric 
application infrastructure which keeps the biometric information of all enrolees in 
an operator controlled database. Even if the centralised equipment is well pro-
tected, at least the capture devices are weak points in the system exposed to all 
kind of attacks and manipulations. In addition, the specific biometric characteristic 
may be expressed in very different forms from human to human. General purpose 
measurement equipment may fail to make an optimal raw data capture over the 
full population. As a consequence the requested features may not be reconstructed 
by the feature evaluation algorithm for a substantial fraction of the population or 
the resulting query templates may be too far away for a unique and reliable result 
in the comparison step. In addition centralised control systems bear all the dangers 
to the security and the privacy of the enrolled individuals that have been discussed 
in the above paragraphs.  
                                                          
19 E.g., the Data Protection Seal of the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein in Germany, see 
https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/guetesiegel/, or the European Privacy Seal EuroPriSe, 
http://www.european-privacy-seal.eu/. 
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All the above problems are directly or indirectly related to the system architec-
ture with centralised components and data. Especially for type 2 models (access 
control) new approaches with a decentralisation of the biometric data have been 
developed to ease the above outlined drawbacks of biometric authentication. Sys-
tems with templates or even templates and the matching process on personal smart 
cards are examples of such improved architectures with reduced exposure of bio-
metric data. An even more radical improvement can be achieved with the architec-
ture model of encapsulated biometrics. In this scheme the whole biometric system 
is enclosed in a personal device that performs the full biometric recognition proc-
ess customised for the user. The system has to recognise only one person and thus 
it stores only one set of reference templates. The encapsulated biometric system is 
securely enclosed in a tamper resistant device that performs the biometric recogni-
tion process in a predefined and secure way. The result of the biometric recogni-
tion of the user is communicated to the requesting organisation through crypto-
graphic credentials which cannot be manipulated by the legitimate user nor a third 
party. The authenticating organisation does not hold any biometric data and thus it 
cannot jeopardise the biometric privacy of the authenticated subjects.  
The encapsulated biometric model represents a shared control model where the 
authenticating organisation defines and controls the biometric evaluation process 
and its results and the biometric subject controls the biometric data and the usage 
of the biometric device (see Figure 4.6). This model fulfils the security needs of 
the authenticating organisation and the privacy need of the authenticated biometric 
subject in the best possible way. A necessary precondition for a biometric system 
to work in an encapsulated model is the ability to enclose the whole process in a 
secured personal device that works reliable even in a hostile environment. Finger-
print, iris, handwriting or voice biometric characteristics are suitable for such ar-
chitecture. First realisations of such a user-centric model have appeared now on 
the market of authentication devices20.  
Encapsulated biometrics
Biometric 
data
User
Biometric 
processing
Organisation
Capture ResultCharacteristics
User-controlled Operator-controlled  
Fig. 4.6. Encapsulated biometrics enclosed in a device that allows a sharing of control: The 
data and the usage is controlled by the using subject; the processing and the evaluation 
result is controlled by the authenticating organisation 
                                                          
20 Bodily functions, Finance & Economics, The Economist, 2008-07-10. 
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4.2.4 RFID21 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is increasingly used for various 
applications, including retail applications, transportation, aviation, healthcare, 
automatic toll collection, security and access control. RFID tags are tiny electronic 
radio tags that can be embedded in or affixed to objects for the purpose of identify-
ing the object via a radio link. RFID readers can read the unique ID code and any 
other information stored in RFID tags remotely by sending and receiving a radio 
frequency signal. In an RFID system, RFID readers are connected to a backend 
system which processes the data read from tags and can link them to other data 
stored in backend databases (see Figure 4.7)  
RFID tags in general come in many different types and have different charac-
teristics regarding e.g., power source, operating frequency and functionality. Thus 
they can be classified in a number of different ways. A common way to classify 
RFID tags in a general way is to divide them into active or passive tags. Active 
RFID tags have a permanent power supply. Hence these tags can perform ‘compu-
tations’ continuously and independently from the environment.  
Active tags also have in general much more computation power compared to 
passive ones. Hence they can do much better cryptographic operations. Both prop-
erties make active tags much more appropriate for applying security and privacy 
protecting mechanisms. But active tags are orders of magnitude larger than pas-
sive ones. 
Passive tags can from a privacy and security standpoint be further divided into: 
basic, very low-cost tags; symmetric-key, low-cost tags; and public-key, more 
expensive tags. 
RFID tags
Wireless
Communication
RFID reader
RFID backend system
 
Fig. 4.7. An RFID system 
                                                          
21 Authors: Simone Fischer-Hübner, Hans Hedbom, Karlstad University. 
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According to NIST22, ‘the most prominent industry standard for RFID are the EP-
Cglobal specifications and standards for supply chain and patient safety applica-
tions’. EPCglobal divides the tags into different classes. The different classes have 
different security and cryptographic capabilities. Tags belonging to the EPCglobal 
Class-0 or Class-1 of the first generation have no security functionality. 
The operating distance, data transfer speed and tag reading speed of an RFID-
system is dependent on the radio frequency of the tag. In general one could say that 
the higher the frequency the higher the data transfer speed and the tag reading speed. 
High frequency tags are also usually designed to operate over longer distances.  
The use of RFID systems can enhance the efficiency and functionality of such 
applications, create new services and can provide further benefits and added value 
for the owner of RFID tagged items (e.g., smart fridges operating in combination 
with RFID tagged items, or the possibility to include warranty information on 
tags).  
Privacy Issues 
Besides such benefits and opportunities, RFID technology however also poses 
severe privacy problems. Privacy as an expression of the right of self-determination 
and human dignity is considered a core value in democratic societies and is recog-
nised either explicitly or implicitly as a fundamental human right by most consti-
tutions of democratic societies. In the era of modern information technology, an 
early definition of informational privacy was given by Alan Westin: ‘Privacy is 
the claim of individuals, groups and institutions to determine for themselves, 
when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others’. 
The German Constitutional Court had also defined privacy in its Census decision 
as the right to informational self-determination, i.e., individuals must be able to 
determine for themselves when, how, to what extent and for what purposes infor-
mation about them is communicated to others.  
The question whether information on RFID tags qualify as personal data is not 
always straightforward to answer. Moreover this question also usually depends on 
the tag’s lifecycle, as in some parts (usually in the beginning) of the lifecycle the 
information on the tag may not classify as personal data whereas in other parts it 
may. RFID tags can either directly contain personal data, e.g., biometrics that are 
stored on RFID tags in European passports, or can include data that could be 
linked to an identified or identifiable person and thereby classify as personal data. 
Examples for the latter case are for instance situations where individuals carry or 
wear tagged items, which can be associated with them, where data on the tag can 
be linked to identifiable data stored in the backend databases or where individuals 
have RFID tags implanted (see also the next section). The problem whether profiling 
on the basis of a unique product code on a tag (e.g., on the watch of a customer 
                                                          
22 (U.S.) National Institute of Standards and Technology, Guidelines for Securing Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) Systems Special Publication 800-98, April 2007. 
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visiting a supermarket) is enough to justify personal data processing, even if the 
identity of the person (name, address, etc.) cannot be determined with reasonable 
efforts, has been controversially discussed. Whereas according to the traditional 
view, the data on the tag are not personal data, the opposite opinion was recently 
voiced by the Article 29 Working Party (Art29DPWP, 2005) as well as in 
(Hildebrandt and Meints, 2006) who have interpreted the term ‘identifiable’ more 
broadly encompassing also re-recognition of a person. 
RFID-related privacy threats can basically be divided into privacy threats 
within the reader-tag system and privacy threats at the backend. Privacy threats 
within the reader-tag system comprise unauthorised reading and manipulation of 
information, cloning of tags and real-time tracking of individuals. RFID readers 
can potentially secretly scan and track RFID tags that individuals passing by are 
wearing or carrying, without the concerned individual’s knowledge or consent. Con-
sequently, privacy principles implemented by the European Legal privacy Frame-
work, such as transparency, informed consent, or more generally the right of infor-
mational self-determination, are at stake. Privacy threats at the backend include 
profiling and monitoring specific behaviour. Besides, there are security-related 
threats for the confidentiality, integrity (including malware threats), availability and 
authenticity of personal data stored on the tag or in the backend system. 
The Article 29 Working Party and privacy and consumer organisations, such as 
CASPIAN and EPIC have voiced privacy concerns and discussed high-level pri-
vacy guidelines / requirements for RFIDs. Several trials and plans for using RFID 
in supply chain applications were confronted with protests by consumers, who felt 
that their privacy was at risk.  
Towards a Holistic Framework 
RFID-related privacy problems can however not be addressed solely by legal and / 
or technical measures but require a holistic approach. For instance, RFID applica-
tions, such as RFID implants, even though they are legally compliant, might raise 
ethical questions that need to be addressed as well. Besides, social aspects of user 
acceptance and trust also need to be taken into account. The FIDIS Deliverable 
D12.3 presents a first attempt of ‘A Holistic Privacy Framework for RFID Appli-
cations’. After discussing the problem space from the technological, legal, ethical 
and social science perspectives and illustrating those problems with the help of 
scenarios, a holistic approach to privacy-enhancements is presented, which fol-
lows a development approach starting with social, ethical and legal requirements 
and measures, and then continuing with classifying technical and organisational 
measures and guidelines to some of those requirements. Important requirements 
and measures for an holistic approach to privacy-enhancements, which are dis-
cussed in more detail in D12.3, can be summarised as follows: 
• User control as a prerequisite to technology acceptances needs to become a 
general guideline for manufacturers and vendors (see also Bizer and Spieker-
mann, 2006). 
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• The basic principles of the current European regulatory framework on pri-
vacy and data protection apply and need to be interpreted for RFID applica-
tions. Important legal principles include the principle that data are proc-
essed fairly and lawfully and only under the grounds of Art. 7 EU Direc-
tive 95/46/EC (e.g., if the data subject has given his / her informed con-
sent), the principles of data minimisation, transparency and right of the data 
subjects in RFID applications. The principle of transparency, which is es-
pecially at stake in AmI environments, requires that each RFID reader and 
RFID tag must be clearly labeled if analogical laws existent in other pri-
vacy-related areas (like in the case of surveillance cameras) are adopted.  
• Available technical privacy-enhancing measures, which can also be applied 
in combination, can be classified as follows: 
─ Measures for preventing unauthorised read-outs, e.g., with the help of 
the kill- or sleep-commands. 
─ Measures for blocking access to the tags, e.g., with the help of blocker 
tags, proxy-devices (watchdogs). 
─ Authentication measures, e.g., based on symmetric or asymmetric cryp-
tographic protocols. 
─ Cryptographic measures for enhancing privacy, including ‘minimalistic 
cryptography’ for rotating pseudonyms that are replacing the tag’s 
code, or universal re-encryption of the tag’s identifier. 
─ Measures for preventing tracking at application layer (i.e., via its unique 
global identifier), communication, and / or at network layer. 
─ Privacy-enhancements by pseudonym usage. 
─ Privacy measures for enforcing user self-control or voluntary commit-
ments by organisations for processing data properly. Such measures in-
clude ‘soft-blocking’ based on a user-defined privacy policy or meas-
ures based on the trusted computing concept for controlling the adher-
ence to a commitment. 
Overall Conclusions 
Summarising, the overall conclusions are the following (Fischer-Hübner and Hed-
bom, 2008): 
• The use of RFID technology in several contexts and its role as a prime 
Ambient Intelligence enabler raises important data protection and privacy 
threats.  
• The current legal privacy framework partly gives too much room for in-
terpretation and does not always give clear answers with regards to RFID 
technology. For example, the essential question how to determine the data 
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controller in an RFID application who is responsible for the lawful data 
processing, is not always straightforwardly answered. Also, specific pro-
visions of the e-Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC are not always applicable, 
as they presuppose processing of personal data in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications services in 
public communications networks. RFID technology however neither 
needs a publicly available electronic communications network nor does it 
involve respective providers. Such issues are currently being addressed 
by the EU. 
• We believe that in order to get a privacy-friendly RFID system both the 
RF-subsystem and the backend system needs to provide privacy protection. 
Since the backend system presumably is under the control of the data con-
troller while some parts of the RF-subsystem is not (notably the RFID tag), 
it is of utmost importance that the RF-subsystem provides for its own pri-
vacy protection. 
• Many proposals for Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs) for RFID ex-
ist—but only a few of them really seem to be feasible and all of them have 
some shortcomings, i.e., none provides the ‘ultimate’ solution addressing 
all RFID-related privacy problems. One of the main problems is that low-
cost RFID tags by themselves currently cannot offer any solution for strong 
privacy. Nevertheless, in the short term the mechanisms suitable for a 
given area of application should be implemented in order to increase the 
level of privacy the RFID system offers.  
• The state-of-the-art at the moment is to have a privacy patchwork for RFID 
rather than a holistic and integrative approach. A lot more effort in terms of 
research and development seems to be necessary to finally get a true holis-
tic privacy framework for RFID applications. Among other things, low cost 
RFID tags with better and stronger cryptographic mechanisms need to be 
developed, transparency and awareness needs to be raised and the incen-
tives for manufacturers and users of RFID technology to develop more pri-
vacy-friendly and secure solutions need to be increased. 
• The combination of RFID and profiling, eventually coupled with many 
other privacy-sensitive means and techniques such as biometrics, may be a 
major privacy concern, as RFIDs, profiling and biometrics themselves al-
ready bear many risks, which are multiplied in combination.  
• And finally, more research into life cycle analysis methods for RFID sys-
tems is needed to gain a clearer view of the data flows throughout the ap-
plication’s lifecycle and for subsequently developing a more fine-grained 
set of recommendations. 
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4.2.5 Credential Systems23 
Access control typically is carried out based on a claim of the user (e.g., I’m 
authorised to use this application), the verification of this claim (these steps are 
also called authentication) and the assignment of a set of rights to the user (this 
step also is called authorisation). In distributed identity management environments 
the claim of the user also may include the rights he requests in the context of the 
application. In this case we also speak of claim-based access control. 
Claim-based access control relies on credentials to tackle cross-domain authori-
sation. A credential is used by a party (holder) to prove its attributes. A credential 
is issued by a trusted third party (issuer) that asserts some attributes or claims 
regarding the holder. The integrity and origin of the claims are guaranteed by a sig-
nature of this issuer. Credentials are strongly associated with a secret of the holder, 
e.g., private key, to make sure that they cannot be used by another party. Knowl-
edge of this secret is proven when using the credential, e.g., when signing a mes-
sage. As a result, a third party can check the attributes of the message author (see 
also Bauer, Meints, Hansen, 2005).  
This section focuses on two advanced types of credentials. First, ‘minimal disclo-
sure tokens’ rely on cryptographic primitives that make it possible to reveal a subset 
of the claims and to ensure unlinkability, i.e., the issuer cannot trace the holder. 
Second, the logic-based ‘Security Policy Assertion Language’ enables taking ac-
cess control decisions based on large sets of claims extracted from policies and 
credentials. 
Minimal Disclosure Tokens 
In today’s online world, individuals are registered in hundreds if not thousands of 
organisational databases. Organisations are under increasing pressure to share this 
identity-related information with others to improve service, cut costs, and combat 
fraud. Both organisations and individuals stand to benefit.  
In response to the demand for cross-organisational data sharing solutions, the 
computer industry has been working since the late nineties on an emerging iden-
tity infrastructure that will enable online data sharing across disparate computer 
systems. The emergence of an Internet-scale online identity infrastructure is not 
without challenges, however.  
Firstly, care must be taken that individuals do not lose all control over the ex-
tent to which others can monitor their actions and learn (let alone misuse) private 
information about them. Making individuals a choke point for the flow of infor-
mation about them is far from sufficient: this ‘user-centric’ approach may do noth-
ing but greatly expand the ability of organisations to share personal information. 
This is particularly troublesome if each data sharing results in a common identifier 
for previously unlinked accounts: once all of an individual’s accounts are ‘feder-
                                                          
23 Authors: Stefan Brands, Microsoft; Laurent Bussard, EMIC; Joris Claessens, EMIC; 
Christian Geuer-Pollmann, EMIC; Ulrich Pinsdorf, EMIC. 
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ated’, nothing stops organisations from directly exchanging information about the 
individual between themselves. The resulting online infrastructure would have 
unprecedented privacy consequences and be a huge boon to identity thieves. 
Second, there are major security challenges for organisations. For example, 
when an online service provider relies on an identity ‘claim’ that has been issued 
by another organisation, how can it be sure that the information is authentic and 
pertains to the individual that is requesting a service? How can the issuing organisa-
tion be prevented from learning competitive information about the service provider’s 
clients, let alone from surreptitiously accessing their accounts? How to prevent de-
nial-of-service attacks and ensure availability of third-party identity claims? Com-
pounding the challenge is that the threats in a distributed data sharing environment 
do not come only from outsiders: attacks may originate from the organisations that 
issue identity claims, as well as from hackers of these organisations. 
Following the invention of public-key cryptography in the mid seventies, cryp-
tographers have worked for several decades on a holistic solution to these chal-
lenges. This research has resulted in sophisticated techniques for so-called ‘mini-
mal disclosure tokens’ (sometimes also referred to as anonymous credentials, a 
term that does not do justice to the power of the technology). Minimal disclosure 
tokens are basic cryptographic constructs for protecting digital information. They 
are issued by ‘issuers’ to ‘users’ by means of an issuing protocol, presented by 
their users to ‘verifiers’ by means of a presentation protocol, and optionally for-
warded by verifiers to third parties (such as auditors). Since minimal disclosure 
tokens are just sequences of zeros and ones, they can be transferred electronically 
and can be verified by computers. 
Minimal disclosure tokens are ideal for sharing identity-related information 
across organisations: 
• User-centric: Using minimal disclosure tokens, organisations can securely 
share information via the individuals to whom it pertains or via other 
intermediating parties (such as brokers and outsourcing suppliers). The 
multi-party security features of minimal disclosure tokens prevent any un-
authorised manipulations of protected information, not only by outsiders 
but also by intermediating parties. For instance, issuers can protect identity 
claims against unauthorised lending, pooling, cloning, discarding, and re-
use by encoding them into minimal disclosure tokens. At the same time, 
intermediating parties can see the information that is shared, enabling them 
to boycott inappropriate exchanges. They can also be actively involved in 
the flow of protected information, helping to determine how organisations 
conduct data exchanges. Furthermore, they can store protected information 
upon issuance so that it can be ported and used off-line. 
• Selective disclosure: Identity information encoded into minimal disclosure 
tokens can be selectively disclosed in a fine-grained manner. By way of 
example, the user of a minimal disclosure token stating that its holder is a 
Dutch citizen born on August 12, 1966 can present the token in a manner 
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that reveals only that the holder is over 18 and European.24 As another ex-
ample, a token that specifies its holder’s real name can be presented in a 
manner that proves that the name is not contained on a blacklist of sus-
pected terrorists, without revealing anything else. 
• Unlinkability: Minimal disclosure tokens can be issued and presented 
without creating unwanted linkages. This enables organisations to issue au-
thentication tokens to identified individuals that can subsequently be used 
to access protected resources anonymously or pseudonymously. It also en-
ables account holders to retrieve and present protected identity claims 
without thereby enabling organisations to link the source and destination 
accounts. This protects against unwanted profiling across spheres of activ-
ity and minimises the risk of identity theft by insiders and hackers. At the 
same time, individuals who abuse services can be excluded from further 
participation via several revocation methods that do not contravene the pri-
vacy features of minimal disclosure tokens. 
• Non-transferability: Issuers can prevent users from transferring (copies 
of) minimal disclosure tokens that convey privileges, entitlements, and 
other personal credential information. One solution is to encode private in-
formation of the designated token holder into the tokens; the token holder 
can hide this data at presentation time (owing to the selective disclosure 
feature), but would need to reveal it in order to enable others to present the 
tokens. For stronger protection, issuers can electronically bind minimal 
disclosure tokens to a previously issued trusted module (such as a tamper-
resistant smart card or a Trusted Computing chip) that can enforce security 
policies (such as non-transferability) throughout the life cycle of the to-
kens; in contrast to PKI certificates, a single low-cost module can protect 
arbitrarily many minimal disclosure tokens. 
• Private audit trails: Relying organisations can capture signed transcripts 
that prove their interactions with individuals. Prior to storing or forwarding 
signed transcripts, some or all of their disclosed contents can be censored 
without destroying their verifiability. This enables organisations to protect 
their own privacy and autonomy interests vis-à-vis auditors. 
A detailed description of how these features are achieved is outside the scope of 
this section.25 
                                                          
24 Technically, the ‘over-18’ property is proved by providing a zero-knowledge proof 
that the value (e.g., total number of days or minutes) representing today’s date minus 
the token value representing the birth date is greater than the value that represents 18 
years. The ‘is-European’ property is proved by demonstrating in zero-knowledge that 
the country code encoded in the token is in the set of country codes representing all 
European countries. 
25 A starting point to learn more is Stefan Brands: ‘Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures 
and Digital Certificates; Building in Privacy,’ MIT Press, ISBN 0-262-02491-8, avail-
able at http://www.credentica.com/technology/book.html. 
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The privacy features of minimal disclosure tokens hold unconditionally, in the 
strongest possible sense: issuing and relying organisations cannot learn anything 
beyond what users choose to disclose when presenting their tokens, even if they 
collude and have unlimited resources to analyse protocol data.  
Minimal disclosure tokens are not merely an academic construct: leading industry 
players are working to productise minimal disclosure token technologies. For exam-
ple, Microsoft has announced plans to implement its U-Prove technology (see 
http://www.credentica.com) into Windows Communication Foundation and Win-
dows CardSpace, and IBM has developed a similar technology (see http://www. 
zurich.ibm.com/security/idemix) that it plans to contribute to open source. 
Advanced Claims: Security Policy Assertion Language 
SecPAL (Becker et al., 2006; Humphrey et al., 2007) is a security policy language 
developed to meet the access control requirements of large-scale Grid Computing 
Environments. SecPAL is declarative, logic-based, and builds on a large body of 
work showing the value of such languages for flexibly expressing security poli-
cies. It was designed to be comprehensive and provides a uniform mechanism for 
expressing trust relationships, authorisation policies, delegation policies, identity 
and attribute assertions, capability assertions, revocations, and audit requirements. 
This provides tangible benefits by making the system understandable and analys-
able. It also improves security assurance by avoiding, or at least severely curtail-
ing, the need for semantic translation and reconciliation between disparate security 
technologies.  
A very simple example could look as follows (see also Becker et al., 2006). Re-
searcher Fanny wants to access a file on a file server. The company’s security 
token service (STS) issued a token to Fanny: ‘STS says Fanny is a researcher’. 
The assertions are encoded in XML and signed by the issuer of the assertion, typi-
cally the STS. Let’s assume that the file server has a security policy: a) ‘STS says 
FileServer can say x can read y’ and b) ‘FileServer says x can read file://project 
if x is a researcher’. Finally, Fanny wants to read a file on the file server. She 
sends her read request together with her assertion to the file server. The file 
server is protected with a policy enforcement point that triggers the following 
SecPAL query at the policy decision point: ‘Fanny can read file://project’. In 
this case we assume that the STS acts both as token issuer and as policy decision 
point. The SecPAL engine has Fanny’s assertion, the policy and the query and 
uses an inference mechanism to determine if the query can be deduced from the 
policy and the assertions.  
It is remarkable that the assertions, the policy and the query are expressed in 
the same language. The verbs ‘says’ and ‘can’ acts as a special keyword in the 
SecPAL even allows limited and unlimited delegation chains with a combina-
tion of both keywords ‘can say’. In the example we see this when the STS al-
lows the file server to define who may access the files. SecPAL defines a set of 
verbs such as ‘read’, ‘write’, ‘execute’ but is open for new verbs. However, the 
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current research license allows only a fixed set of verbs in the context of Grid 
Computing.26 
Becker et al. (2006) mention a list of design principle for the language: expres-
siveness, readable syntax, unambiguous semantics, effective decision procedure 
and extensibility. Humphrey et al. (2007) provide details from an implementation 
using SecPAL as fine-grained access control for GridFTP where SecPAL outper-
forms the other tested access control mechanism. 
4.3 Supporting Technologies 
In this section technologies supporting identity management intentionally or indi-
rectly are introduced and discussed. In the context of FIDIS research the following 
technologies are investigated: 
• Trusted Computing 
• Protocols with respect to identity and identification  
• Service Oriented Architectures 
• Digital Rights Management 
Most of these technologies carry the potential to be (ab)used for profiling and 
surveillance like identity management. However, for some of them application 
scenarios were developed that need to be considered as enhancing. In this section 
the problem domains and privacy enhancing application scenarios are presented. 
4.3.1 Trusted Computing27 
An important point when implementing cryptographic schemes and protocols is 
the fact that security needs some kind of ‘trusted anchor’, i.e., one cannot achieve 
protection within a completely untrusted environment. Trusted Computing (TC) is 
about establishing this trusted anchor. 
The first seminal publications in the field of Trusted Computing can be dated 
back to the early 1970s (e.g., Baran, 1973). It became an ‘emerging’ technology in 
the past few years due to the fact that an industry consortium ― the Trusted Com-
puting Group (TCG)28 ― started to develop industry standard specifications that 
support trusted computing for PCs, clients and servers, mobile devices and a 
trusted infrastructure. The TCG has more than 120 members including nearly 
every important IT company (e.g., AMD, HP, IBM, Intel, Microsoft and SUN). 
The powerful market position of these companies drives the spreading of Trusted 
Computing as defined by the Trusted Computing Group.  
                                                          
26 See http://research.microsoft.com/projects/SecPAL/ for details. 
27 Author: Stefan Köpsell, TU Dresden. 
28 http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/. 
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Nevertheless it is still (emotionally) discussed what exactly TC is29 and whether 
it has more benefits for users or for commercial organisations, e.g., in scenarios 
like Digital Rights Management (DRM). 
In general TC comprises at least the following technologies and mechanisms: 
• Trusted computing base which is the minimal set of hardware (e.g., the 
TPM-chip specified by the TCG), firmware and software (e.g., a secure op-
erating system) which is necessary for enforcing a security policy. 
• Secure I/O which offers protected paths for all data from the input through 
the processing until the output. That means for instance that the user can be 
sure that the inputs he made can not be intercepted by malicious software 
like keyboard loggers. 
• Sealed memory which refers to a protected memory which prevents other 
processes (and even unprivileged parts of the operating system) from read-
ing / writing to it. 
• Sealed storage a technology which ensures that persistent data can only be 
read and modified by exactly the same combination of hardware / software 
which has written the data. 
• Authentic booting and (remote) attestation which allows a user to be 
sure with which well defined hard- / software he interacts and to prove this 
even to third parties. 
• Unique digital identities for computers which means that each Trusted 
Computing base has a unique digital identity enabling the owner of a com-
puter to prove that a certain message originated from a computer he owns 
or that two messages come from the same computer; that two messages do 
not come from the same computer. 
An important fact and fundamental principle about Trusted Computing is, that 
Trusted Computing does not mean that the computing environment (hard- and 
software) can be trusted—but instead one has to trust it. According to Ross Ander-
son, ‘In the US Department of Defense, a ‘trusted system or component’ is de-
fined as ‘one which can break the security policy’.’30 This simply means, if the 
trustworthiness assumptions one has about a certain Trusted Computing based ICT 
system are wrong, then the whole protection offered by this system (in terms of 
security and privacy) can be broken. 
Immediately the question arises to what extent should one trust the Trusted 
Computing. If one is willing to absolutely trust the Trusted Computing, many (if 
not all) security- and privacy-related problems can be solved easily. The reason is 
that most of the complex and complicated cryptographic mechanisms and proto-
                                                          
29 This is not surprising as the term ‘trust’ itself is heavily discussed within different com-
munities. 
30 Ross Anderson: ‘Trusted Computing’ Frequently Asked Question. Version 1.1 (August 
2003), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html. 
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cols just exist or were designed with the goal to circumvent the untrustworthiness 
of the computing environment (soft- and hardware) used by the communication 
partners and third parties. 
As example in (Müller and Wohlgemuth, 2007) the delegation of rights and se-
crets to proxies which act on behalf of the customer was identified as one of the 
fundamental problems (with respect to security and privacy) in multi-stage business 
processes. Clearly if these proxies are not trustworthy, then they can use the data 
provided by the user to contravene the interests of the user and violate his privacy.  
Using Trusted Computing on the proxy side could easily solve this problem 
(under the assumption that one is willing to absolutely trust the Trusted Comput-
ing as mentioned above). In this case the proxy would be trustworthy (and can be 
trusted) ‘by definition’. 
On the other hand the history of security and privacy technologies as well as 
ICT in general has shown that such absolute error-less and correctly designed and 
working systems do not exist and will (with high probability) never exist. There-
fore Trusted Computing should only be seen as a ‘helping tool’ which could be 
used to enhance the overall security a system provides. 
In (Iliev and Smith, 2005) the fundamental property of Trusted Computing is 
described as follows: ‘We call the physically protected and trusted components of 
a server K, [...]. In any given client-server application, we can view K as an exten-
sion of the client: from a trust perspective, K acts on the client’s behalf, but physi-
cally, K is co-located with the server.’ 
Derived from this fundamental property, using Trusted Computing comprises at 
least the following two overall goals / approaches: 
• To prevent security threats by implementing (traditional) security mecha-
nisms in a more trustworthy way or (more general) use Trusted Computing 
to secure the basic operations of the devices (e.g., client PCs, servers or 
mobile phones). This comprises all the well known technologies offered by 
Trusted Computing.  
In order to exemplify this one can look at a typical e-business scenario 
where the communication between the involved parties (users and services) 
has to be confidential and integral. The (cryptographic) protocols and 
measures used can benefit from TC and the TPM, e.g., the cryptographic 
keys could be stored under the control of the TPM (using the Sealed Mem-
ory and Sealed Storage functionality) making attacks on the communica-
tion confidentiality much harder.  
In general it seems that this ‘classical’ approach for enhancing the secu-
rity is the one which is in the focus of the industry and corresponding busi-
ness consultancies31. 
                                                          
31 See for instance: Jon Oltsik: ‘Trusted Enterprise Security. How the Trusted Computing 
Group (TCG) Will Advance Enterprise Security.’ White Paper, Enterprise Strategy 
Group, January 2006, https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/news/Industry Data/ ESG_ 
White_Paper.pdf. 
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• Enabling the communicating parties to check, monitor and audit the trust-
worthiness of each other using remote attestation. Even third parties could 
be permitted to do so (e.g., on behalf of a communicating entity).  
Online banking can serve as an example scenario to illustrate this. If 
trusted computing is used on the service side (i.e., the bank) then the user 
can check if the bank server is secure. Moreover if trusted computing is 
used on the user side then the bank can check if the computer of the user is 
secure, e.g., not tampered with malicious software. Depending on the de-
tected security status both parties can for example limit the maximum 
amount of money allowed for online banking transactions. Finally these 
checks could be outsourced to third parties, e.g., the bank side could be au-
dited by data protection authorities.  
The FIDIS consortium analysed the potential of Trusted Computing for supporting 
security and privacy within various areas and scenarios. The different possibilities 
of applying Trusted Computing in e-Business scenarios are elaborated in Müller 
and Wohlgemuth (2008). Finally Alkassar and Husseiki (2008) give a broader 
overview on the applicability and implications of Trusted Computing in the area 
of identity management.  
Note that so far the standards and technologies developed by the Trusted 
Computing Group focus primarily on software based attacks and not hardware 
based (i.e., physical) ones. Therefore TC does not offer protection if a device 
itself could be manipulated by the attacker. This has to be taken into account 
when considering the overall security of a given system, especially in scenarios 
where mobile devices are involved which could easily get lost or stolen. But 
even in the online banking scenario as illustrated above this has to be evaluated. 
On the one side one can assume that the bank is well experienced in offering 
excellent physical protection for valuable goods including their servers. On the 
other side one has to consider that many banks outsource their IT resulting in 
much less physical protection to the servers. 
But focusing on software-only attacks is not the only controversial issue of 
Trusted Computing as defined by the Trusted Computing Group. Trusted Comput-
ing might have a negative impact on the privacy of its users as for instance remote 
attestation reveals the whole configuration of users’ devices (e.g., all running 
software, installed hardware etc.). Each TPM device has a unique cryptographic 
key which could be misused to uniquely identify the device and consequently its 
users (e.g., if Trusted Computing is applied to mobile phones). Trusted Computing 
could also be misused to prevent the execution of certain ‘unwanted’ software or 
operating systems (e.g., Open Source ones). Alkassar and Husseiki (2008) as well 
as Müller and Wohlgemuth (2008) discuss the shortcomings of Trusted Comput-
ing and related legal and social aspects in more detail.  
Summarising one can say that Trusted Computing is a necessity for privacy and 
security in the information society but needs to be carefully designed so that it 
does not do completely the contrary.  
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4.3.2 Protocols with Respect to Identity and Identification32 
In computing, protocols are standards that control or facilitate the connection, 
communication, and data transfer between two endpoints. As communication is 
the basis of our Information Society, protocols are highly relevant for all activities 
in information and communication technologies. What is more, usually users are 
not aware of running protocols at least as long they function seamlessly and facili-
tate the desired services. This also means that people lack knowledge on privacy 
risks or other identity-related aspects when using protocols. One example is the 
repeated usage of some identifiers, e.g., MAC (Media Access Control) addresses 
or Cookies, which enable linkage and profiling by any observer. In some cases the 
network infrastructure relies on the transfer of these identifiers—real data minimi-
sation would require a major redesign of the protocols. 
When discussing protocols, there is a need to distinguish between their specifi-
cation and implementation. Although these should be one and the same, in prac-
tice implementations do not always properly adhere to what is laid down in the 
specifications—this may be done accidentally, but in some cases deviations from 
the specifications are intended, e.g., when implementing light-weight versions of 
the full specification or when contradictions are discovered in the documents 
which cannot be overcome. 
When describing networking protocols, typically the ISO/OSI layer model is 
used. This model describes seven layers with the following functions (Tanenbaum, 
2003):  
Table 4.1. Layers and corresponding functions in the ISO/OSI reference model 
Data Unit ISO/OSI layer Function 
7: Application Network process to application (http) 
6: Presentation Data representation and encryption 
 
Data 
5: Session Interhost communication 
Segments 4: Transport End-to-end connections and reliability (TCP) 
Packets 3: Network Path determination and logical addressing (IP) 
Frames 2: Data link Physical addressing (MAC & LLC) 
Bits 1: Physical Media, signal and binary transmission 
In (Hansen and Alkassar, 2008) an overview is given of the identity-related as-
pects of network protocols on different technical layers: host-to-network layer 
(e.g., Local Area Network (LAN) and Wireless LAN (WLAN) communication), 
Internet layer (e.g., Internet Protocol (IP) and Internet Protocol Security (IPSec)),  
                                                          
32 Author: Marit Hansen, Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein. 
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Table 4.2. ISO/OSI layers of selected protocols from the TCP/IP suite 
TCP/IP 
layer 
ISO/OSI 
layer Protocols 
Application 5-7 HTTP SMTP Telnet DNS SNMP SSH RTP 
Transport 4 TCP UDP SCTP
Internet 3 IP (IPv4, IPv6) ICMP IPSec
Link /  
Physical /  
Host-to-
Network 
1-2 
Ethernet (CSMA/CD), 
WLAN, Token Ring, PPP, 
ISDN, Modem 
transport layer (e.g., Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP)) and application layer protocols (e.g., HyperText Transfer Proto-
col (HTTP), Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) and Domain Name System 
(DNS)). The following figure shows how the analysed protocols belonging to the 
TCP/IP protocol suite map to the ISO/OSI seven layer reference model. 
In addition, protocols for privacy policies (ISO/OSI layer 7) are being analysed 
concerning their potential for improving the user’s privacy. For both categories of 
protocols, the main results of the survey done in (Hansen and Alkassar, 2008) are 
summarised in the following paragraphs. 
Network Protocols 
When analysing identity and identification aspects of network protocols, the fol-
lowing criteria were put in the focus: 
• Which identifiers are used in the protocols? How unique are they? Are all 
identifiers visible, or may there be hidden identifiers? 
• Is linkage of different protocol runs possible? Could users be profiled or 
even identified by this linkage? 
• Which additional user data—i.e., which data directly linked to the user in-
volved (or his machine)—are disclosed? 
• Is it possible to avoid or circumvent the information disclosure, and if yes: 
with which effort? 
The analysis of network protocols shows that virtually any commonly used proto-
col reveals linkable information which could be used for profiling. For instance, 
transmitted identifiers such as IP addresses (in all Internet communication), Cookies 
(in HTTP) or MAC addresses (in Ethernet or WLAN communication) enable for 
each observer linkage of different protocol usages and thereby profiling of the user’s 
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(or computer’s) behaviour. Dynamically assigned IP addresses are not uniquely 
bound to the user’s computer—unlike the MAC address which typically is static to 
the network interface. However, IP addresses of one and the same Internet provider 
change only within a certain range, and in addition they can be mapped to geo-
graphical data to find out the region where that IP address was registered. This is 
also relevant for location privacy when mobile users use various WLANs. 
The profiling possibility with linkable data may yield so extensive profiles that 
the link to the user can be easily established and thus they become personal data. 
Further, there are protocols which explicitly disclose user data, e.g., the header 
fields ‘Referer’, ‘User-Agent’, ‘Accept’ or ‘Accept-Language’ in HTTP or the in-
formation on sender and receiver of e-mails in SMTP. Again, these data alone or 
in combination may identify the users and are privacy-relevant. For instance, 
sender and receiver of e-mails give observers such as eavesdroppers or other par-
ties the information that there is a relationship between the e-mailing parties. It 
can be used to figure out a user’s social network. This is also true when the e-
mails are encrypted: The header information stays the same even if the payload, 
i.e., the e-mail’s body, is encrypted. Concerning HTTP, the content of the header 
field ‘User-Agent’ may be used to categorise the user as ‘early adopter’ (if very 
new browsers are employed) or it can be used as first analysis of possible security 
vulnerabilities on the user’s computer (if old versions have not been updated). 
‘Accept-Language’ informs about the cultural background of the user. The ‘Ref-
erer’ field contains the URL where the user came from—if this had been a search 
engine, the Referer usually also comprises the search terms. 
Looking into protocols is not done by many users. Several people are aware of 
those options which can be configured in their application software, in particular 
in the browser. However, the choices that can be made on that level are very lim-
ited. For HTTP, browsers usually offer to configure the behaviour when setting or 
deleting Cookies. Since of the middle of 2008, so-called ‘privacy modes’ are be-
ing established from various browser manufacturers which among others may 
prevent the transmission of Referer information. 
For most cases avoiding or circumventing the shown protocol-related threats 
for privacy and data protection cannot be done easily, though. One partial solution 
could be anonymisation services or other data minimisation techniques on the 
lower protocol layers that can be used to blur some of the traces one leaves while 
using the Internet. For browsing this can be done by substituting IP addresses or 
suppressing Cookies and interesting information in HTTP header fields. However, 
these services neither offer a convincing level of protection nor have they 
achieved a level of stability and quality of service necessary for every day use by 
the masses. Nevertheless they are suitable tools at least for some use cases. An 
easy to implement measure (from a technological point of view) would be to use 
link encryption of every single data link. This would greatly enhance privacy 
against outsiders—e.g., eavesdroppers on the lines—who would neither learn the 
communications’ content nor (most of) their circumstances.  
What are the odds that upcoming Next Generation Internet protocols will take 
into account the sketched privacy issues and handle them in an appropriate way? 
4 High-Tech ID and Emerging Technologies 165 
 
FIDIS work (Hansen and Alkassar, 2008) took a look into important consortia 
dealing with new protocols to straighten out flaws created decades ago or to meet 
requirements stemming from actual usage patterns that were not foreseeable when 
the old protocols were designed. Important proposals comprise: 
• the Internet2 Network33 which provides a high-performance backbone net-
work to U.S. research and education institutions, offering community con-
trol of the fundamental networking infrastructure.  
• the GÉANT34 and GÉANT235 network infrastructure, i.e., a multi-gigabit 
pan-European data communications network, reserved specifically for re-
search and education use across Europe.  
• the ‘TRIAD – Translating Relaying Internet architecture integrating Active 
Directories’36 architecture meant as overlay to the current Internet by defin-
ing an explicit content layer. 
• the U.S. initiative ‘FIND – Future Internet Network Design’37 and the 
European ‘Future Internet Research and Experimentation’38 initiative, both 
long-term approaches to provide networks for new Internet-enabled appli-
cations and services.  
All these proposals aim at improving security and robustness. Identity manage-
ment and accountability are less prominently dealt with; privacy issues are rarely 
addressed as yet. 
The next section describes privacy policy languages and protocols which are 
situated on higher levels in the network—they indeed try to take care of data pro-
tection issues. 
Privacy Policy Languages and Protocols 
In the World Wide Web, privacy policies are an important mechanism to inform 
users on the planned data processing. However, privacy policies often are hard to 
understand as they may be written in foreign languages or contain too much legal-
ese. They are hard to compare with each other because they differ in scope, tack-
led issues and granularity. And why bother to read them if they usually offer no 
choices anyway (except for ‘take it or leave it’)? 
This could be different with machine-readable privacy policies, expressed in 
specific languages: Privacy policy languages are designed to support organisations 
and users in managing their privacy policies and preferences. The development of 
privacy policy languages, the specification of their syntax and semantics, and the 
                                                          
33 http://www.internet2.edu/network/. 
34 http://www.geant.net/. 
35 http://www.geant2.net/. 
36 http://gregorio.stanford.edu/triad/. 
37 http://find.isi.edu/. 
38 http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/fire/. 
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interaction with ICT systems, e.g., protocols for negotiating and matching poli-
cies, belong to a highly dynamic field. Since 1997 when W3C started the devel-
opment of the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), a variety of languages and 
protocols have been proposed which are specifically designed to manage privacy 
policies or—even if their main objective was less privacy-specific—can be ap-
plied for data protection purposes as well. 
The vast area of privacy policy languages is not limited to the World Wide 
Web. Four categories of privacy policy languages are distinguished (Kumaraguru 
et al., 2007):  
1. sophisticated access control languages (e.g., SAML, WSPL or XACML).  
2. enterprise privacy policy languages (e.g., Enterprise Privacy Authorisation 
Language (EPAL)). 
3. web privacy policy languages (e.g., P3P on the organisational side, APPEL 
or XPref on the user’s side). 
4. context-sensitive languages (e.g., Geopriv as an authorisation policy lan-
guage for controlling access to location information or Protune (Provisional 
trust negotiation) as a rule-based trust negotiation framework). 
In all of these areas, several proposals are being developed and evaluated. After 
involvement in P3P and EPAL, the World Wide Web Consortium continues its 
work on privacy policy language in the Policy Languages Interest Group (PLING). 
It is unlikely that the outcome of that work will be the one and only policy lan-
guage. Instead other ways for interoperability of privacy policy languages are 
envisaged, e.g., by specifying common interfaces or establishing gateway services 
between different policy language domains. 
Without doubt, protocols for negotiating policies and enforcing them will play a 
prominent role in the next years. As full data avoidance is not an option in many 
practical cases, policies and policy enforcement have to step in. From today’s per-
spective it is not clear which languages and protocols will prevail in which areas. 
Importance of Designing Protocols with Privacy Experts 
According to Lessig, protocols belong to the major regulators which have a pro-
found impact on society and whose implications must be considered (Lessig, 
1999). This applies for all implementations of protocols, forming the architecture 
of ICT and providing today’s possibilities for usage. In addition, the specifications 
of protocols already play a role as they are the blueprint not only for implementa-
tions thereof, but define interfaces to other specifications and implementations. If 
protocols, i.e., their specifications and / or their implementations, are faulty, the 
applications on top usually cannot eliminate the mistakes, but often even intensify 
the consequences. 
Considering the complexity of the area and the massive influence of protocols 
on the Information Society, a privacy and linkability analysis should be performed 
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during the design phase of each protocol, taking into account also linkage possi-
bilities from and with the environment where the protocols will be run. Article 20 
of the Directive 95/46/EC deals with ‘prior checking’ which should be carried out 
when the processing operations are ‘likely to present specific risks to the rights 
and freedoms of data subjects’. In particular outside the European Union, e.g., in 
Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand, a similar procedure is also 
known as ‘Privacy Impact Assessment’. Taking this seriously, privacy experts 
would have to be involved right from the beginning in each design process of 
communication protocol specifications. 
The general participation of Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) and other 
trusted parties in the technology design process for better trust and trustworthiness 
might help. But this is no silver bullet since DPAs lack resources for skilled per-
sonnel travelling and participating in meetings where protocols are being speci-
fied. Indeed during the last decades very few DPAs were involved when protocols 
were specified, and those involved usually participated only in the design of spe-
cific protocols and languages focusing on privacy and data protection (such as P3P 
or EPAL). However, all kinds of protocols have been discussed and criticised in 
the privacy community, e.g., because of shortcomings concerning important pri-
vacy concepts such as data minimisation, transparency or the user’s self-
determination. Mostly the criticism came only after or in a late phase of the speci-
fication process, having a limited effect. 
Summarising, a major challenge is not only the understanding of today’s proto-
col world, but also the design and specification of new protocols. In particular in 
those areas where right now standardisation work is being performed, it is highly 
recommended to integrate experts from the fields of identity and privacy in the 
processes. Naïve specifications and implementations of global standards will usu-
ally cement not so privacy-friendly information and communication technologies. 
Even if privacy-invasive requirements such as demanded data retention are an 
obstacle to pure privacy-enhancing design of protocols, data protection functional-
ity could be massively improved. In addition, the impact of these protocols, their 
interdependencies and the whole specification process have to be made more 
transparent to decision makers and citizens because protocols are the backbone of 
our Information Society. 
4.3.3 Identity Management in Service Oriented Architectures39 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is a collection of cooperating services, which 
jointly fulfil a higher-level operation through communication. They fall in the class 
of distributed systems (Coulouris et al., 2005). A special attribute of SOA is the 
loose binding between the services. Typically the binding happens only at run-time, 
which means that a service learns only at this point in time with which actual service 
                                                          
39 Authors: Stefan Brands, Microsoft; Laurent Bussard, EMIC; Joris Claessens, EMIC; 
Christian Geuer-Pollmann, EMIC; Ulrich Pinsdorf, EMIC. 
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instance it is communicating. This feature is called loose binding and is in fact said 
to be one of the core characteristics of SOA (Cabrera and Kurt, 2005).  
This leads us back to identity management, since each service typically runs on 
behalf of a user’s or organisation’s identity. Considering that SOA allows, in addi-
tion to direct user interaction, an automated, intermediated and even delegated 
access to resources, leads to challenging identity management issues. Services 
which are bound only at run-time have to establish a verifiable trust relationship 
based on the identities of service owners. These issues are even amplified if we 
consider large, distributed service landscapes involving multiple business roles. 
Although SOA is commonly used inside organisations40, service calls may even 
span across company boundaries, which leads to so called service federations 
between the hosting organisations (Goodner et al., 2007). 
The need for standardisation of protocols to establish trust among services was 
already identified back in 2002, for instance the W3C created a number of work-
ing groups on various aspects of web services (Jacobs, 2002). The first version of 
the WS-Trust protocol was published in December 2002.  
In the remainder of this section we want to introduce the most important proto-
cols in the Web services world. Web services represent the most widely used type 
of SOA. The communication is XML-based and typically transported via HTTP. 
Web services fulfil a number of basic standards such as the Simple Objects Access 
Protocol (SOAP) for method invocation or Web Service Description Language 
(WSDL) for interface description. We describe the protocols WS-Security, WS-
Trust and WS-Federation. WS-Trust is actually an identity protocol for trust estab-
lishment. It is based on WS-Security which supports the primitives for identity, 
key exchange, cryptography and signatures (see also Bauer, Meints, Hansen, 
2005). WS-Federation goes a step further than WS-Trust and allows establishing 
of virtual collaborations across trust boundaries; it is thus comparable to a cross-
certification in the PKI world. Having described the protocols, we want to intro-
duce CardSpace in Section 4.5.2 as a use case that uses WS-Trust and WS-
Security for identity management.41 
Trust in Service Oriented Architectures  
The WS-Trust specification (Nadalin et al., 2008) introduces the concept of ‘secu-
rity token services’ (STS). A security token service is a Web service that can issue 
and validate security tokens. For instance, a Kerberos ticket granting server would 
be an STS in the non-XML world. A security token service offers functionality to 
issue new security tokens, to re-new existing tokens that are expiring and to check 
the validity of existing tokens. Additionally, a security token service can convert 
one security token into a different security token, thus brokering trust between two 
trust domains.  
                                                          
40 The Open Group maintains an extensive list of SOA reference projects at http://www. 
opengroup.org/projects/soa-case-studies/page.tpl?CALLER=index.tpl&ggid= 996. 
41 CardSpace focuses mainly on user-centric identity management interaction, but it is 
applicable in SOA scenarios as well. 
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For example, a Web service describes required security tokens for Web service 
calls using WS-SecurityPolicy (Lawrence et al., 2008). A requestor may want to call 
that specific Web service but may not have the right security tokens indicated by the 
policy. The Web service may require Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
credentials from a particular trust domain whereas the requestor only has an X.509 
certificate from its own domain. By requesting the ‘right’ matching token (creden-
tial) from the security token service, the requestor may get back a token from the 
STS that can be included when calling the Web service in question. The decision 
what exactly the ‘right’ token is can be made either by the requestor or by the STS. 
After inspection of the Web service’s policy, the requestor may specifically ask the 
STS: ‘I have the attached X.509 certificate and need a SAML token.’ The other 
option is that the requestor includes its possessed tokens and states what Web ser-
vice it intends to call: ‘I possess the following tokens and I would like to call the 
Web service http://foo/bar. Please give me whatever token may be appropriate.’  
WS-Trust provides a rich interface that permits the implementation of various 
use cases. For instance, the requestor may include time variant parameters as en-
tropy for a token generation process. The token service may return secret key ma-
terial to the requestor (so-called proof-of-possession tokens) along with the re-
quested security token, so that the requestor can prove that it possessed the secu-
rity token. For instance, the requested security token may be a certificate whereas 
the proof-of-possession token is the associated private key. The security token 
service may also return multiple keys like a certificate along with its validation 
chain or it may create key exchange tokens with which the requestor can encrypt 
key material for the intended Web service. A requestor can also express require-
ments on algorithms and key strengths for required tokens.  
WS-Trust defines protocols including challenge-and-response protocols to ob-
tain the requested security tokens, thus enabling the mitigation of man-in-the-
middle and message replay attacks. The WS-Trust specification also permits that a 
requestor may need a security token to implement some delegation of rights to a 
third party. For instance, a requestor could request an authorisation token for a 
colleague that may be valid for a given time interval. WS-Trust utilises WS-
Security for signing and encrypting parts of SOAP messages as well as WS-
Policy / SecurityPolicy to express and determine what particular security tokens 
may be consumed by a given Web service. WS-Trust is a basic building block that 
can be used to rebuild many of the already existing security protocols for trust 
establishing and make them fit directly in the Web services world by using Web 
service protocols and data structures.  
The WS-Security (Lawrence et al., 2006) specification defines mechanisms for 
integrity and confidentiality protection, and data origin authentication for SOAP 
messages and selected parts thereof. Hence, it offers the basic primitives to estab-
lish mutual trust using WS-Trust. The cryptographic mechanisms are utilised by 
describing how XML Signature and XML Encryption are applied to parts of a 
SOAP message. That includes processing rules so that a SOAP node (intermediar-
ies and ultimate receivers) can determine the order in which parts of the message 
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have to be validated or decrypted. These cryptographic properties are described 
using a specific header field, the <wsse:Security> header. This header provides a 
mechanism for attaching security-related information to a SOAP message, 
whereas multiple <wsse:Security> headers may exist inside a single SOAP mes-
sage. Each of these headers is intended for consumption by a different SOAP in-
termediary. This property enables intermediaries to encrypt or decrypt specific 
parts of a message before forwarding it or enforces that certain parts of the mes-
sage must be validated before the message is processed further.  
Besides the cryptographic processing rules for handling a message, WS-Security 
defines a generic mechanism for associating security tokens with the message. 
‘Associating a security token’ means that one or more tokens are included in 
<wsse:Security> headers in the message and that a referencing mechanism is in-
troduced to refer to these tokens. Tokens generally are either identification or 
cryptographic material or they may be expressions of capabilities (e.g., signed 
authorisation statements).  
For instance, the certificate for signature validation may be added into the header. 
That may be done by either placing it into the signature itself (which makes re-
usage a bit complicated and fragile) or by directly making it a child of the 
<wsse:Security> header and referencing it from the signature. The latter use has 
the advantage that other signatures or security operations may also directly refer to 
that token. WS-Security, available in version 1.1 since February 2007, defines a 
simple username token, a container for arbitrary binary tokens (base64 encoded), a 
container for XML-formatted tokens, and an encrypted data token. 
WS-Federation introduces mechanisms to manage and broker trust relationships 
in a heterogeneous and federated environment. This includes support for federated 
identities, attributes and pseudonyms. ‘Federation’ refers to the concept that two or 
more security domains agree to interact with each other, specifically letting users of 
each security domain access services in the other security domain. For instance, two 
companies that have a collaboration agreement may decide that employees from the 
other company may invoke specific Web services. These scenarios with access 
across security boundaries are called ‘federated environments’ or ‘federations’. Each 
security domain has its own security token service(s), and each service inside these 
domains may have individual security policies. WS-Federation uses the WS-
Security, WS-SecurityPolicy and WS-Trust specifications to specify scenarios to 
allow requesters from the one domain to obtain security tokens in the other domain, 
thus subsequently getting access to the services in the other domain.  
To illustrate this concept with an example, imagine that a user Fanny from 
company A intends to access Frank’s Web service in company B. Fanny and 
Frank do not have any prior relationship, but both companies have agreed to fed-
erate certain services, and the decision is that particular users from company A 
may access dedicated services inside company B. By some means, Fanny knows 
the endpoint reference of Frank’s service. Using the basic mechanisms defined in 
WS-PolicyAttachment, WS-MetadataExchange (Ballinger et al., 2006), and WS-
SecurityPolicy, Fanny retrieves the security policy of Frank’s service and detects 
that the security token service STSB of company B issues tokens to access this 
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service. Fanny issues a security token request to the security token service STSA 
of company A and claims to need a token to access STSB. Company A and com-
pany B are federated together, therefore STSA is able to issue a security token for 
Fanny. Of course, that may depend on whether Fanny belongs to the group of A’s 
employees that are permitted to access Frank’s services. In the next step, Fanny 
requests a token for accessing Frank’s service from STSB and proves her authori-
sation by utilising the token issued by STSA. After validating that the STSA secu-
rity token is valid, STSB issues a security token for access to Frank’s service (as-
suming that Frank’s Web service belongs to the group that company B offers to 
company A). In the last step, Frank’s Web service is invoked by Fanny. During 
that final request, Fanny presents the token issued by STSB.  
Besides this introductory example, WS-Federation shows how such a federa-
tion could work across multiple security domains or how delegation could be 
used. Delegation means that a user may delegate certain access rights on one fed-
erated resource to a different federated resource. Additionally, WS-Federation 
defines mechanisms to handle pseudonyms (aliases used at different services and 
federations) and management mechanisms for the pseudonyms, including single 
sign-in and sign-out (sign-out refers to the removal of pseudonym-related informa-
tion at different services). 
The whole suite of Web service-related specifications is much broader, even 
just the part dealing with security and privacy. Geuer-Pollmann and Claessens 
(2005) as well as Cabrera and Kurt (2005) provide a solid overview on the most 
relevant standards and their relations to each other. 
4.3.4 Digital Rights Management42 
Digital rights management (DRM) refers to several concepts to restrict arbitrary 
use of data and to limit it in accordance with a certain defined policy (e.g. Hansen 
and Möller, 2005). The core-functionality of DRM also can be summarised as 
policy enforcement. Policies in this context contain access control policies. As a 
result DRM also can be understood as an implementation of identity management 
core-functionalities (namely authentication and authorisation). The concepts for 
DRM differ in the technological approaches used and the targets DRM is used for. 
The targets are mainly (Alkassar and Husseiki, 2008: 42): 
• DRM in companies or governmental administrations to protect customers’ / 
citizens’ data 
• DRM for personalised files 
• DRM for media files and 
• DRM for software products.  
                                                          
42 Author: Martin Meints, Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Hol-
stein. 
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In addition the use of DRM has been discussed in the context of fraud prevention, 
especially the prevention of manipulation of bank notes43. Many recent DRM 
concepts rely on Trusted Computing. Many existing and planned technical imple-
mentations of DRM were investigated with respect to their potential impact on the 
privacy of customers and users. In most cases the impact on privacy was consid-
ered to be negative or at least discussed controversially (for an overview see Hansen, 
Möller, 2005, Alkassar, Husseiki, 2008 pp. 42-45 and references cited therein).  
In the context of FIDIS research it was mainly investigated whether and how 
far DRM could be used to protect privacy of customers and citizen. While the 
direct application of DRM by customers in their relationship to organisations for 
technical and economic reasons does not seem to be promising, the application of 
DRM in organisations supported by trusted third parties (from the customers’ 
viewpoint) seems to be more realistic. Together with policy management lan-
guages such as the Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL)44 DRM 
may become an important tool for the organisation internal and inter-organisation-
client enforcement of security and privacy policies. Potential applications are the 
protection of the confidentiality of highly sensitive data, and the enforcement of 
the processing of this data for a defined purpose. These approaches also may be of 
interest for the processing of sensitive data along a chain of organisations, where 
service oriented architectures (SOA) are used and in the context of application 
service providing (ASP, also called saas, software as a service). 
However, these concepts are more or less in an early conception phase and fur-
ther research is necessary (also see Grimm et al., 2005). 
4.4 Emerging Technologies45 
In some contrast to the FIDIS research on IMS discussed thus far, the research in 
the area of emerging technologies has focused on less well developed technology, 
services or applications which may prove to have a weighty impact in the field of 
identity. ‘Emerging technologies’ is a topic which pervades all of the areas into 
which the work of FIDIS is separated and clustered, and so it is important to un-
derstand the potential impact which emerging technologies may have. While a 
relatively formalised description of emerging technologies has emerged over the 
last few years, i.e., the result of the convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnol-
ogy, information technology, cognitive science, robotics, and artificial intelli-
gence, within FIDIS the term is considered to be broader. We have defined this as 
(identity-related) technologies or applications whose practical usage is still far 
behind their potential. 
                                                          
43 E.g., Schulzki-Haddouti, C., EU-Kommission für Banknoten-Kopierschutz, Heise-News, 
http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/47083. 
44 See, e.g., EPAL 1.2, W3C Member Submission, http://www.w3.org/Submission/EPAL/. 
45 Author: Mark Gasson, Reading University. 
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The use of techniques to profile people from varying sized sets of data have be-
come increasingly utilised in light of the evolving underlying technologies which 
both enable the processing through powerful infrastructures, and the development 
of the profiling techniques themselves. It is obvious that this type of technology 
will continue to develop inline with the technologies which support it, and many 
have prophesised a shift in the way in which we interact with machines based on 
the extrapolated potential of this technology. The focus of the work investigated 
within FIDIS based on emerging technologies is broadly related to this developing 
area, the emergence of Ambient Intelligence. 
4.4.1 Ambient Intelligence 
Ambient Intelligence (AmI) has been presented for many years as the panacea for 
the human / technology interaction bottleneck. The very essence of AmI is to en-
rich the user experience by capitalising on the potential that additional computing 
processing can bring. Part of this enrichment is achieved by augmenting the user 
in their daily lives through additional services and access to additional informa-
tion. However, this is achieved whilst actually reducing the focus on the tradi-
tional explicit data input / output paradigm—a true shift in our concept of what a 
computer is, and how we should interact and use it. The aim of the AmI environ-
ment is to provide a context aware system, using unobtrusive computing devices 
that will improve the quality of people’s lives by acknowledging their needs, re-
quirements and preferences and thus acting in some way on their behalf. To 
achieve this, the ‘intelligent’ environment, or rather, an intelligent agent within the 
environment needs to build up a profile of each individual, and be able to subse-
quently link the profile with the correct individual. In essence, the environment 
itself has become the interface to the distributed, seamless and invisible AmI. AmI 
itself will not be the outcome of any single technology or application—rather it is 
an ‘emergent’ property. Essentially, AmI is more than just the sum of its parts. 
Ubiquitous Computing is the next wave of technology, whereby many thousands 
of wireless computing devices are distributed in the environment in everyday ob-
jects around us. Clearly this technology integration into the environment is a key 
aspect of AmI. Ubiquitous Communication will allow robust, ad-hoc networks to 
be formed by this broad range of mobile and static devices, forming a ubiquitous 
system of large-scale distributed networks of interconnected computing devices. 
By adding intelligent user interfaces and integrating sensing devices, it should be 
possible to identify and model user activities, preferences and behaviours, and 
create individualised profiles. These key aspects are all required to achieve the 
ideal AmI environment. 
The concept of AmI is largely based on the idea that by augmenting an envi-
ronment with sensor technologies and by providing near unlimited storage and 
processing capabilities, the intentions, needs and desires of people can be pre-
dicted and catered for. The result is that people will not need to know how to op-
erate complex technologies—instead the technology will interact with them in 
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intelligent and intuitive ways. Clearly collating information is the key. However, if 
an environment is to know what a person wants or needs without being explicitly 
told, then this information needs to come from indirect means—i.e., the technol-
ogy, or rather the environment as a whole becomes less interactive, and more proac-
tive. Through varying levels of sensor data gleaned from pervasively embedded 
sensors, dynamic autonomic profiles can be drawn to enable this proactive ability. 
Intuitively these profiles can only be as good as the data that feeds them, and the 
processing available to create them, and hence the focus of development is to extract 
as much data as possible from all aspects of the users and their interactions within an 
AmI space, as well as developing the underlying infrastructure through which this 
data can be ‘mined’ for new information. This is further discussed in Chapter 7. 
From an implementation point of view, there are a range of technologies which are 
considered applicable in the fabric of an AmI environment. These stem from funda-
mental sensor technology for AmI spaces which will enable the data capture from 
which new information can be inferred, to enabling technology, i.e., technology 
which will serve in the underpinning infrastructure to provide the networking and 
processing capabilities necessary in the envisaged future scenarios of augmented 
living. Notably, and in contrast to other texts on AmI-related technology, we have 
investigated the concepts of ‘sensors which detect sensors’ and ‘mobile user-
controlled sensors’ which may prove to be ways in which our privacy can be con-
served to a greater extent in environments where data capture becomes ubiquitous. 
In any case, it is likely that the user and the controller of the data will not be 
one and the same. Indeed in some cases it may be unclear who is collecting data 
from sensors and what it is being used for. One route to counteract such issues is 
the idea that new technologies should incorporate ‘privacy by design’, that is the 
mechanisms necessary for user control of their data should be an inherent aspect 
of the technology. To this end, many privacy advocates have suggested that 
emerging technologies and applications such as AmI should undergo mandatory 
privacy impact assessments before they are released into the mass market. To a 
large extent the technologies for AmI are speculative in that, in the main, they 
have not reached a mature level of development or deployment. Thus, it is exactly 
at this point where such technology needs to be discussed beyond the domain of 
those creating it to ensure that we are able to stay in control. ‘Staying in control’ is 
a broad turn of phrase, and indeed its exact meaning and context here is open to 
interpretation. However, what is for sure is that there are fundamental rights and 
freedoms which must be ensured. 
The area of AmI has been extensively explored by the FIDIS NoE from the 
perspective of various disciplines. The fundamental enabling technologies which 
may form key parts of the AmI infrastructure have been discussed in Gasson and 
Warwick (2007), and Schreurs et al. (2005). Further to this, the very pertinent 
legal issues which need addressing, and the possible routes through which they may 
be addressed have been highlighted by Hildebrandt and Koops (2007), while solu-
tions to the inherent security and privacy issues have been further developed by 
Hildebrandt and Meints (2006) and Fischer-Hübner and Hedbom (2008).  
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4.4.2 Human ICT Implants 
The relatively new trend for low-tech human implants has recently risen in the 
public consciousness, although less publicised developments of high-tech implants 
in the medical domain have been progressing for several decades. Indeed, a sig-
nificant drive behind the development of so called Information Communicating 
Technology (ICT) implant devices is medical—i.e., restoring deficient human 
abilities. It is clear that this application area is one which can be greatly enhanced 
through the new emerging technology phenomenon, and it is not clear where this 
may ultimately take us. The ability to form direct, bi-directional links with the 
human brain will open up the potential for many new application areas. Scientists 
predict that within the next thirty years neural interfaces will be designed that will 
not only increase the dynamic range of senses, but will also enhance memory and 
enable ‘cyberthink’ — invisible communication with others and with technology 
(McGee and Maguire, 2007). But are these claims realistic, and should they be 
taken seriously? As discussed by Kosta and Gasson (2008), current applications 
alone introduce challenging questions. Indeed the increasing commercialisation of 
human ICT implants has generated debate over the ethical, legal and social aspects 
of the technology and its products. 
The basic foundations of advanced ICT implant devices are being developed 
for clear medical purposes, and it is reasonable to assume that few would argue 
against this progress for such noble, therapeutic causes. Equally, as has been dem-
onstrated by cosmetic surgery, we cannot assume that because a procedure is 
highly invasive, people will not undergo it. So, while we may be some way away, 
there is clear evidence that devices capable of significant enhancement will be-
come reality, and most probably will be deployed in applications beyond their 
original purpose. Thus, clear consideration needs to be given now to the funda-
mental moral, ethical, social, psychological and legal ramifications of such en-
hancement technologies. From a legal perspective, the implantation of ICT de-
vices may challenge the right of bodily integrity for every human being, as a fur-
ther expression of the right to self-determination. Moreover the use of human ICT 
implants allows the development of vast numbers of applications that will enable 
the tracking, tracing and profiling of the individual, as the unique number of the 
implant and / or the information stored on it can be linked with great certainty to 
an identified or identifiable natural person. However, the processing of such in-
formation should follow the principles on the processing of personal data, as they 
are described in the European data protection directive. 
The use of ICT implants, especially in the medical sector, has been most wel-
come as it has introduced devices such as cardiovascular pacemakers, cochlear 
implants, deep brain stimulators for Parkinson’s disease, and insulin pumps. Not-
withstanding the positive impact of such devices to the health condition of the 
patients, the restoration of human capabilities and especially the enhancement of 
existing ones are not free of ethical issues. The ethical debate reveals a number of 
counter arguments against the use of ICT implants on human beings.  
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Given the current situation, it is not too soon to start real debate. To this end, 
the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies have published 
their opinion on the use of ICT implants and notes that implants, if not used prop-
erly, may prove to be a threat to human dignity, by at the very least not respecting 
an individual’s autonomy and rights. Such dangers are already present with cur-
rent medical ICT implant devices, whereby even simple security such as basic 
access control is not implemented. 
4.5 Use Cases 
In this chapter user cases of identity management systems relying on the technolo-
gies described are presented and analysed. This includes: 
• ID documents and the electronic passports (referring especially to PKI, 
electronic signatures, biometrics and RFID) 
• CardSpace (referring especially to credential systems, WS-Security and 
WS-Trust) 
4.5.1 ID Documents46 
As a use case for IMS in e-government ID documents were investigated. ID 
documents are mainly used to authenticate or identify citizens in the context of 
general governmental procedures or procedures in specific sectors such as health 
or social insurance. Another important functionality is facilitating electronic sign-
ing together with PKI. Apart from a general overview covering these functional-
ities, national ID cards, citizen cards and European implementations of the epass-
port were investigated in depth (Meints and Hansen, 2006). The selected imple-
mentations are especially of interest as a number of technologies are already im-
plemented in this context, e.g., electronic signatures, PKI and biometrics. In addi-
tion these ID documents are increasingly understood as an important enabler for e-
government. With the transition from paper based government to e-government 
electronic IDs (eIDs) are needed to authenticate or identify participants such as 
governmental officials or citizens. In this context (semi-) automated border con-
trols procedures using Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs) are also 
understood as authentication and authorisation procedures. 
Traditionally the binding between an ID document and its (authorised) user was 
ensured by a seal, a hand written signature of a governmental official or a traditional 
photo of the user. In the electronic world this does not work anymore as these 
attributes can be verified electronically only with difficulty and spoofing becomes 
                                                          
46 Author: Martin Meints, Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Hol-
stein. 
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easy. In the electronically enabled ID documents investigated in the FIDIS project 
mainly two ways were used to ensure the binding between an ID document and its 
user: (1) knowledge, typically a PIN, and (2) biometric reference data (typically 
biometric raw data such as standardised images of the face or finger tips).  
A special focus was put on the Austrian and Belgium citizen card as they are 
both conceptualised as key-enablers for the national e-government strategies. Both 
concepts were investigated from a security and privacy point of view.  
The Austrian citizen card is no traditional smart card based solution, but can be 
implemented in various formats, e.g., USB sticks and on mobile phones. The Aus-
trian citizen card concept is remarkable due to the authentication mechanism used 
(see Meints and Hansen, 2006: 90-94). Based on a decree, the so called ‘Bereich-
sabgrenzungsverordnung’, governmental sectors are defined. The citizen card 
provides specific identifiers for each citizen in each of these defined sectors. The 
authentication of citizen is carried out based on SAML certificates and requires a 
specific local software component. In addition the Austrian citizen card can be 
equipped with an electronic signature. Linkability between sector-specific identi-
fiers (called sector-specific PINs) is possible only in exceptional cases and needs 
to be carried out by the data protection authority acting as a trusted third party. In 
the context of the public sector this is the strongest mechanism to enforce purpose 
binding and to hamper function creep implemented today. In December 2005 the 
first prize for data protection in the category of European public authorities was 
awarded to Austria for the concept of the ‘Bürgerkarte’ by the Data Protection 
Agency of the Community of Madrid.47 
The Belgian citizen card is based on a traditional smart card. The authentication 
of the user is based on X.509v3 certificates and is ensured and secured via PKI run 
by order of the Belgian state and a PIN (Meints and Hansen, 2006: 90-99). The 
citizen card itself has in the first version no privacy-enhancing functionality (De 
Cock et al. 2006). Recently as a transparency enhancing measure the online access 
of citizens to their own files at the National Register was introduced. 48 In this file 
also the access of citizens’ data by Belgian public authorities is stored together 
with the purpose of the access. 
Intensive research was carried out in the context of the electronic passport 
(epass). With the integration of an RFID chip and biometric reference data the 
epass became part of a largely distributed border control infrastructure. Vulner-
abilities, threats and resulting security and privacy risks for the citizen were ana-
lysed and recommendations for future versions made. The technical concept of the 
first version of the epass, issued since November 2005, showed severe weak-
nesses, and for some of these exploits were already demonstrated (Meints and 
Hansen, 2006; Kosta et al., 2007; Meints and Hansen, 2008). Examples are: 
                                                          
47 http://www.austria.gv.at/DesktopDefault.aspx?TabID=4951&Alias=bka&infodate=19.12. 
2005 and http://www.ptapde.gr/news/PR_e-PRODAT_20051215.pdf. 
48 Access is possible via https://www.mijndossier.rrn.fgov.be/, but requires a client certifi-
cate which is provided from the citizen card. 
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• Cryptographic weaknesses in the central access control mechanism called 
Basic Access Control (BAC); in addition in many cases BAC is not effec-
tive as together with the epass the BAC key has to be handed over to pri-
vate organisations, especially hotels; in Sweden data needed to calculate 
the BAC key was publicly accessible for all Swedish citizens.49 
• The reading range of the passport could be extended from the planned 10 to 
15 cm up to 50 cm; communication between reader and epass can be eaves-
dropped from a distance up to 10 m. 
• The issuing process for the epass was not mature, official passports with 
photos not belonging to the epassport holder could be retrieved in 14 Euro-
pean member countries50. 
• No security concept compliant with international standards such as ISO/IEC 
27001 or CobiT is available covering all countries, epass and reader infra-
structure and organisational aspects.  
• The data minimisation principle is not implemented because biometric raw 
data (photos of fingerprints and faces) is used instead of templates; biomet-
ric raw data contain additional information that might be used for different 
purposes apart from border control (Kindt and Müller, 2008: 83-84). In ad-
dition the finality principle (purpose binding to prevent function creep) is 
not ensured internationally. 
Fig. 4.8. Attack scenarios for the epass: tracking / deployment of events and eavesdropping 
                                                          
49 This was officially confirmed by the responsible issuing authority for epassports in the 
county of Värmland on 2nd of February 2007. 
50 See the BBC report: ‘My faked passport and me’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/ 
panorama/6158927.stm. 
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In the literature the use of these risks in the context of the following scenarios 
were discussed: (1) tracking and deployment of person-specific events and (2) 
eavesdropping and (ab-) use of epass data, especially the content of the so called 
Data Groups 1 and 2 (DG 1 and 2). The scenarios can be demonstrated as shown 
in Figure 4.7. 
Using the Attack-Tree-Analysis-Methodology developed by Schneier (1999) the 
applicability of these scenarios by states, private organisations and criminal organi-
sations was qualitatively analysed based on the first version of the epass (Meints and 
Hansen, 2008). This is still highly relevant, as epasses of the first version remain 
valid for five to ten years. The following tables summarise and visualise the results 
of the analysis, whereby the colours illustrate qualitatively the risk for the data sub-
ject (dark grey = low, light gray = medium, no background = high): 
Table 4.3. Qualitative analysis of the tracking scenario 
Tracking States Private Organisations Criminal Organisations 
Costs High, but at insular 
places only 
Very high; area cover-
ing infrastructure 
needed 
Very high; area cover-
ing infrastructure 
needed 
Benefit Low apart from 
exceptional cases 
where traditional 
instruments of 
surveillance cannot 
be used 
Limited, as cheaper, 
more target oriented and 
legal methods are avail-
able, e.g., in the context 
of customer loyalty 
programs 
Limited, as cheaper and 
more target oriented 
methods are available, 
e.g., in the context of 
established surveillance 
techniques 
Risks for the  
attacker 
Low / none High compliance risks 
(e.g., Data Protection in 
the EU), damage of 
reputation 
Moderate / managed 
Since November 2007 in most European countries the issuing of the second ver-
sion of the epass started. This version was in most European countries improved 
by: (1) with respect to the entropy of BAC key; (2) information needed to prepare 
fall-back procedures in case biometrics for technical reasons (Failure To Enrol 
(FTE) or False Rejection Rate (FRR)) do not work; (3) maturity of the issuing 
process, as fingerprints are collected directly at the holder of the epass; and (4) 
additional security features in the chip to prevent cloning. These improvements 
make the eavesdropping scenario even more unlikely. But data protection risks 
grew, as with the photos of the finger prints additional biometric raw data are 
stored on the epass. 
For immediate implementation FIDIS researchers recommend (Meints and 
Hansen, 2006; Kosta et al., 2007; Meints and Hansen, 2008): 
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Table 4.4. Qualitative analysis of the deployment-of-events scenario 
Deployment of 
events 
States Private Organisations Criminal Organisations 
Costs High, but at insular 
places only 
High; but at insular 
places only 
High; but at insular 
places only 
Benefit Low apart from 
exceptional cases 
where international 
laws are ignored 
and traditional 
instruments cannot 
be used 
Limited, as cheaper, 
more target oriented 
and legal methods are 
available, e.g., in the 
context of customer 
loyalty programs 
Effective for person-
selective threatening, 
blackmailing and assas-
sination 
Risks for the  
attacker 
Low / none High compliance risks 
(e.g., Data Protection in 
the EU), damage of 
reputation 
Manageable. The event 
can be prepared far in 
advance, criminals do 
not need to be in place. 
Violation of legislation 
seem ‘acceptable and 
managed’ 
Table 4.5. Qualitative analysis of the eavesdropping scenario 
Eavesdropping 
and (ab-)use 
States Private Organisations Criminal Organisations 
Costs Very high; area 
covering infrastruc-
ture needed 
High; at insular places 
or as area covering 
infrastructure 
High; at insular places or 
as area covering infra-
structure 
Benefit Very low as more 
easy and already 
legal alternatives 
are in place 
Limited, biometric raw 
data, especially the 
highly standardised 
photo of the face, may 
be of interest; in many 
cases more simple and 
legal alternate solutions 
are available 
Very low by using epass 
data for identity theft 
Risks for the 
attacker 
Low / none High compliance risks 
(e.g., Data Protection in 
the EU), damage of 
reputation 
Moderate /  
managed 
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• The epass should be protected using a Faraday cage 
• Technical and organisational measures to hamper eavesdropping such as 
shielding of readers should be implemented 
• The epass should be carried around only when needed 
• With the second version of the epass the electronic time stamp should be 
updated before leaving the home country 
• Passport holders need to be informed about organisational security meas-
ures concerning themselves 
• The epass concept should not be transferred to national eIDs without modifi-
cations especially concerning the improvement of access control mechanisms 
In the long run the following recommendations should be taken into consideration: 
• The technical and security concept should be revised taking data and pri-
vacy protection aspects into consideration; in this context it should be 
checked especially whether protected templates or encapsulated biometrics 
could be used 
• As the epass is deployed for international use, the security concept needs to 
take the control over the passport by many states and private organisations 
into consideration 
• It should be considered whether a wireless technique is really needed; in 
any case the wireless data transfer needs to be secured more effectively 
• As the epass is a component of a large information system, life cycle man-
agement is needed. In this context it should be checked carefully how long 
biometric reference data can be used without raising false rejection too 
much e.g., caused by aging of the epass holder.  
4.5.2 CardSpace51 
The software product CardSpace (Alrodhan and Mitchell, 2007) is an example for 
advanced identity management based on WS-Trust, WS-Security, WS-Security-
Policy and some related protocols. CardSpace is the identity selector provided by 
Microsoft, which is shipped with Windows Vista and the .NET Framework 3.0 
and later. It provides four major features:  
• support for any digital identity system  
• consistent user control of digital identity  
                                                          
51 Authors: Stefan Brands, Microsoft; Laurent Bussard, EMIC; Joris Claessens, EMIC; 
Christian Geuer-Pollmann, EMIC; Ulrich Pinsdorf, EMIC. 
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• replacement of password-based Web login  
• improved user confidence in the identity of remote applications.  
Those principles follow the seven laws of identity (Cameron, 2005). CardSpace is 
built on top of the Web Services Protocol Stack. It uses WS-Security, WS-Trust, 
WS-MetadataExchange and WS-SecurityPolicy. This means that it can be inte-
grated with other WS-* applications (Maler and Reed, 2008). In CardSpace a so 
called Information Card contains all claims which are associated with an identity 
of a user. If a web site shall accept Information Cards for authentication, the de-
veloper needs to add an <object> tag to the HTML code of the Web site. This tag 
declares what claims the Web site needs for authentication. The developer has 
then to decrypt and evaluate the token that CardSpace sends to the Web site. In an 
application based on Web services, CardSpace talks directly to the services using 
the aforementioned protocols to learn the service’s policy requirements and to 
deliver the appropriate security token. 
We typically rely on a number of different digital identity systems, each of 
which may use a different underlying technology. To think about this diversity in 
a general way, it is useful to define three distinct roles:  
1. User is the entity that is associated with a digital identity.  
2. Identity provider is an entity that provides a digital identity for a user.  
3. Relying party is an application that in some way relies on a digital identity 
to authenticate a user, and then makes an authorisation decision. 
Given these three roles, it is not difficult to understand how CardSpace can sup-
port any digital identity. A user might rely on an application that supports 
CardSpace, such as a Web browser, to access any of several relying parties. The 
user might also be able to choose from a group of identity providers as the source 
of the digital identity it presents to those relying parties. Whatever choice the user 
makes, the basic exchange among these parties comprises three steps:  
First, the application gets the security token requirements of the relying party 
that the user wishes to access. This information is contained in the relying party’s 
policy, and it includes things such as what security token formats the relying party 
will accept, and exactly what claims those tokens must contain. Once it received 
the details of the security token this relying party requires, the application passes 
this information to CardSpace, asking it to request a token from an appropriate 
identity provider. After this security token has been received, CardSpace gives it 
to the application, which passes it on to the relying party. The relying party can 
then use this token to authenticate the user or for some other purpose. Working 
with CardSpace does not require relying parties or identity providers to implement 
any proprietary protocols.  
CardSpace implements an intuitive user interface for working with digital iden-
tities (see also Pettersson and Meints (2008) for usability aspects of selected func-
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tions of CardSpace). Each digital identity is displayed as an Information Card. 
Each card represents a digital identity that the user can potentially present to a 
relying party. Along with the visual representation, each card also contains infor-
mation about a particular digital identity. This information includes which identity 
provider to contact to acquire a security token for this identity, what kind of to-
kens this identity provider can issue, and exactly what claims these tokens can 
contain. By selecting a particular card, the user is actually choosing to request a 
specific security token with a specific (sub-)set of claims created by a specific 
identity provider. In fact, the user does not need to disclose the full information 
that is associated with an Information Card, but can verify what will be revealed to 
the relying party.  
4.6 Summary and Conclusions 
It is clear that it is essential to understand the impact which High-tech IDs can and 
may have on those that use them. The technologies analysed in this chapter provide 
tools (a) to form and shape partial identities under the control of the identity bearer 
or (b) to describe and model them under the control of external parties which are in 
many cases organisations. Both functions are of high importance in the Information 
Society which is characterised through intensive use of information in society and 
economy, facilitated by highly automated and digitised means of communication. In 
this way the technologies described already and will further fuel the information 
society in the near future. Also important in this context are economic aspects – the 
technologies analysed provide the platform for new products and services and thus 
economic welfare. But how are the functions described put to use? 
The first function allows a user to present itself and to make claims in a new 
communicational context based on information that supports the level of trust 
needed. Important in this context is that the user gets some means to control the 
balancing between opacity and transparency regarding the disclosure of identity 
related information or attributes. The second function provides mechanisms 
needed to verify trust related information provided by the user through user inde-
pendent sources of information and to verify claims made. In this context the ac-
cess to more and more user independent sources for identity related information 
plays an important role. Both functions are not new as such; the difference with 
the described technologies is that they are (a) from a knowledge point of view 
demanding and (b) depending on the way they are used may change the balance 
between opacity and transparency between parties involved in communication. In 
this context organisations typically have more financial and personal resources for 
setting up more sophisticated IMS, potentially resulting in information, and thus 
power, asymmetry. Extreme application scenarios range from opaque and not 
trustworthy clients dealing somehow with organisations on one hand and com-
pletely transparent clients dealing with overly powerful and opaque organisations 
on the other hand. The technologies analysed clearly support both extreme scenar-
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ios. An overly opaque client for example could be generated by the use of creden-
tial systems not relying on a trusted third party, and surveillance like application 
scenarios of DRM, biometrics and RFID or abuse of data collected in AmI envi-
ronments clearly could enable overly powerful organisations.  
In many cases a shift in this balance of transparency and opacity does not hap-
pen on purpose. Weaknesses in the technological design and security holes are 
common reasons providing the platform for a potential shift in the balance of 
power as control by operators and users gets lost. Real life abuse scenarios today 
in many cases seem to be criminally motivated (see Chapter 8).  
Society cannot function with both of the described extreme communication 
models and thus will balance them mainly by developing moral, social and legal 
norms. FIDIS research results support this balancing process by recommendations 
for stakeholders in research, industry and policy making and the general public 
concerning: 
• Application scenarios concerning available and emerging technologies with 
respect to compliance with the existing legal framework 
• Organisational advice for citizens and clients of organisations on how to 
use established identity management systems or components thereof (e.g., 
the epassport)  
• Further research topics e.g., in technology design to support balanced tech-
nical implementations with a reliable control situation 
• Further development of legal frameworks to ban unwanted application sce-
narios and to provide the ground for improved and balanced technical solu-
tions 
It should be noted that most emerging technologies, such as AmI and ICT im-
plants, are different as technological concepts and are not well developed and 
described. As such, their impact on humans and society cannot be assessed based 
on hard facts. In this context existing visions and partial technological concepts 
can be consolidated in scenarios which can be used for formal or non-formal ana-
lytical methods such as a Technology Impact Assessment (TIA) or Strength, 
Weakness, Opportunity and Threat (SWOT) analysis. Especially in case of ICT 
implants, the potential impact by far exceeds aspects of the management of identi-
ties – potentially the personality of the persons concerned may be affected or al-
tered. On the other hand for policy makers there is no immediate need to act, other 
than on the issues surrounding their research and development, as these technolo-
gies are relatively far from being implemented and importantly, there is still time 
for a socio-ethical debate. 
To summarise the FIDIS recommendations, the adoption of the legal frame-
work to the advancement of new technologies should be accompanied by address-
ing the ethical and social issues that the development of new devices may bring. It 
is not only privacy and data protection that are at stake and the discussion on secu-
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rity issues forms only a (temporary) part of the wider debate on how to live in 
tomorrow’s information society. Respect for human dignity and equality and the 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion as well as the freedom to express, 
move, associate and assemble are only some of the rights and freedoms that are 
essentially at stake, where such activities suppose the increasing intervention of 
ICT and converging technologies provided and controlled by third parties. 
References 
Adler, A. (2003), ‘Can images be regenerated from biometric templates?’, Biometrics Con-
ference, Washington. 
Alkassar, A. and Husseiki, R. (eds.) (2008), FIDIS Deliverable D3.9: Study on the Impact 
of Trusted Computing on Identity and Identity Management, Download: http://www.fidis. 
net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp3-del3.9_Study_on_ 
the_Impact_of_Trusted_Computing_on_Identity_and_Identity_Management.pdf. 
Alrodhan, W. A. and Mitchell, C. J. (2007), ‘Addressing privacy issues in CardSpace’, Third 
International Symposium on Information Assurance and Security (IAS 2007), IEEE 
Computer Society, pp. 285-291. 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (Art29DPWP) (2003), Working Document on 
Biometrics, WP 80, Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/ 
2003/wp80_en.pdf. 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (Art29DPWP) (2004), Opinion on More Harmo-
nised Information Provisions, WP 100, Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/ 
privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp100_en.pdf.  
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (Art29DPWP) (2005), Working document on data 
protection issues related to RFID technology, WP 105, Brussels. http://www.eu.int/ 
comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp105_en.pdf. 
Ballinger, K., Bissett, B., Box, D., Curbera, F., Ferguson, D., Graham, S., Liu, C. K., Ley-
mann, F., Lovering, B., McCollum, R., Nadalin, A., Orchard, D., Parastatidis, S., von 
Riegen, C., Schlimmer, J., Shewchuk, J., Smith, B., Truty, G., Vedamuthu, A., Weer-
awarana, S., Wilson, K., Yendluri, P. (2006), Web Services Metadata Exchange (WS-
MetadataExchange), BEA Systems Inc., Computer Associates International, Inc., Inter-
national Business Machines Corporation, Microsoft Corporation, Inc., SAP AG, Sun 
Microsystems, and webMethods. Specification Version 1.1. 
Baran, P. (1964), ‘On Distributed Communications: IX. Security, Secrecy, and Tamper-
Free Considerations,’ Memorandum RM-3765-PR, The Rand Corporation, 1700 Main 
St, Santa Monica, California, 90406. Reprinted in Hoffman L. J. (ed.): Security and Pri-
vacy in Computer Systems; Melville Publishing Company, Los Angeles, California, 
1973, pp. 99-123. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM3765/. 
Bauer, M., Meints, M., Hansen, M. (eds.) (2005), FIDIS Deliverable D3.1 Structured 
Overview on Prototypes and Concepts of Identity Management Systems, Download: 
http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp3-
del3.1.overview_on_IMS.final.pdf. 
186 Martin Meints and Mark Gasson 
 
Becker, M. Y., Gordon, A. D., Fournet, C. (2006), SecPAL: Design and Semantics of a 
Decentralized Authorization Language, Technical Report MSR-TR-2006-120, Microsoft 
Research, Redmond. 
Bizer, J. and Spiekermann, S. (2006), TAUCIS – Technikfolgenabschätzung Ubiquitäres 
Computing und Informationelle Selbstbestimmung, study commissioned by the German 
Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Berlin.   
https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/taucis/ita_taucis.pdf 
Buitelaar, J.C., Meints, M., van Alsenoy, B. (eds.) (2008), FIDIS Deliverable D16.1: Concep-
tual Framework for Identity Management in eGovernment, Download: http://www.fidis. 
net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp16-del16.1-conceptual_framework_for_identity_ 
management_in_egovernment.pdf. 
Cabrera, L. F. and Kurt, C. (2005), Web Services Architecture and Its Specifications: Es-
sentials for Understanding WS-*, Microsoft Press, Redmond.  
Cameron, K. (2005), The Laws of Identity, published as weblog. http://www.identityblog. 
com/stories/2005/05/13/TheLawsOfIdentity.pdf. 
Cavoukian, A. and Stoianov, A. (2007), Biometric Encryption, Ontario, Canada. http://www. 
ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/up-1bio_encryp.pdf. 
Coulouris, G., Dollimore, J., Kindberg, T. (2005), Distributed Systems. Concepts and De-
sign, Addison Wesley.  
De Cock, D., Wolf, C., Preneel, B. (2006), ‘The Belgian Electronic Identity Card (Over-
view)’, in Sicherheit 2005: Sicherheit—Schutz und Zuverlässigkeit, Beiträge der 3. 
Jahrestagung des Fachbereiches Sicherheit der Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. (GI), 
Lecture Notes in Informatics (LNI), Bonner Köllen Verlag, Bonn, pp. 298-301. 
http://www. cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-769.pdf. 
Fischer-Hübner, S. and Hedbom, H. (eds.) (2008), FIDIS Deliverable D12.3: A Holistic 
Privacy Framework for RFID Applications, Download: http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/ 
fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp12-del12.3.A_Holistic_Privacy_Framework_for_RFID_Appli- 
 cations_v2.pdf. 
Gasson, M. and Warwick, K. (eds.) (2007), FIDIS Deliverable D12.2: Study on Emerging 
AmI Technologies, Download: http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-
wp12-d12.2_Study_on_Emerging_AmI_Technologies.pdf. 
Gasson, M., Meints, M., Warwick, K. (eds.) (2005), FIDIS Deliverable D3.2 A Study on 
PKI and Biometrics, Download: http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-
wp3-del3.2.study_on_PKI_and_biometrics.pdf. 
Geradts, Z. and Sommer, P. (eds.) (2006), FIDIS Deliverable D6.1: Forensic Implications 
of Identity Management Systems, Download: http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deli-
verables/fidis-wp6-del6.1.forensic_implications_of_identity_management_systems.pdf. 
Grimm, R., Puchta, S., Müller, M., Bizer, J., Möller, J., Will, A., Müller, A., Jazdejewski, S., 
(2005), Privacy4DRM, Study commissioned by the German Federal Ministry of Educa-
tion and Research, Berlin. https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/drm/privacy4drm.pdf. 
Goodner, M., Hondo, M., Nadalin, A., McIntosh, M. Schmidt, D. (2007), Understanding 
WS-Federation, Technical Report, IBM and Microsoft Corporation. 
Geuer-Pollmann, C. and Claessens, J. (2005), ‘Web services and web service security stan-
dards’, Information Security Technical Report, Vol. 10, pp. 15-24. 
4 High-Tech ID and Emerging Technologies 187 
 
Hansen, M. and Alkassar, A. (eds.) (2008), FIDIS Deliverable D3.8 Study on protocols 
with respect to identity and identification – an insight on network protocols and privacy-
aware communication, Download: http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-
wp3-del3.8_Study_on_protocols_with_respect_to_identity_and_identification.pdf. 
Hansen, M., Krasemann, H., Krause, C., Rost, M., Genghini, R. (2003), Identity Manage-
ment Systems (IMS): Identification and Comparison Study, Kiel. https://www.daten-
schutzzentrum.de/idmanage/study/ICPP_SNG_IMS-Study.pdf. 
Hansen, M. and Möller, J. (2005), ‘Digital Rights Management zwischen Sicherheit und 
informationeller Selbstbestimmung’, in: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informations-
technik (BSI, ed.): IT-Sicherheit geht alle an!, proc. of the 9. German IT-Security con-
gress of the BSI, pp. 159-171. http://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/vortraege/050510_ 
hansen-moeller_bsi.htm 
Heinz, B., Krißler, J., Rütten, C. (2007), ‘Fingerspitzengefühl’, c’t Magazin für Computer-
technik 12, pp. 98-101. 
Hildebrandt, M. and Gutwirth, S. (eds.) (2008), Profiling the European Citizen. Springer. 
Hildebrandt, M. and Koop, B. (eds.) (2007), FIDIS Deliverable D7.9: A Vision of Ambient 
Law, Download: http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp7-d7.9_A_ 
Vision_of_Ambient_Law.pdf. 
Hildebrandt, M. and Meints, M. (eds.) (2006), FIDIS Deliverable D7.7: RFID, Profiling, 
and AmI, Download: http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp7-del7.7. 
RFID_Profiling_AMI.pdf. 
Hill, C. J. (2001), Risk of Masquerade Arising from the Storage of Biometrics, Department 
of Computer Science, Australian National University, Canberra / Australia. 
Humphrey, M., Park, S., Feng, J., Beekwilder, N., Wasson, G., Hogg, J., LaMacchia, B., 
Dillaway, B. (2007), ‘Fine-grained access control for GridFTP using SecPAL’, 8th 
IEEE/ACM International Conference on Grid Computing, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 
217-225. 
Iliev, A. and Smith, S. W. (2005), ‘Protecting Client Privacy with Trusted Computing at the 
Server’, IEEE Security and Privacy 3 (2), pp. 20-28. 
Jacobs, I. (2002), Architectural Principles of the World Wide Web, W3C Working Draft, 
30 August 2002 (outdated). http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/WD-webarch-20020830/. 
Jain, A. K., Nandakumar, K., Nagar, A. (2008), ‘Biometric Template Security’, to appear in 
EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing. http://biometrics.cse.msu.edu/Publi-
cations/SecureBiometrics/JainNandakumarNagar_TemplateSecuritySurvey_EURASIP08.
pdf. 
Kerckhoffs, A. (1883), ‘La cryptographie militaire’, Journal des sciences militaires IX, pp. 
5-38 and pp. 161-191. 
Kindt, E. (2007), ‘Biometric applications and the data protection legislation,’ Datenschutz 
und Datensicherheit 31 (3), pp. 166-170. 
Kindt, E. and Müller, L. (eds.) (2007), FIDIS Deliverable D3.10: Biometrics in identity 
management, Download: http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp3-
del3.10.biometrics_in_identity_management.pdf. 
Kosta, E.and Gasson, M. (eds.) (2008), FIDIS Deliverable D12.6: A Study on ICT Implants, 
Download: http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp12-del12.6.A_Study_ 
on_ICT_Implants.pdf. 
188 Martin Meints and Mark Gasson 
 
Kosta, E., Gasson, M., Hansen, M., Meints, M. (2007), ‘An analysis of security and privacy 
issues relating to RFID enabled ePassports’, in New Approaches for Security, Privacy 
and Trust in Complex Environments, proc. of the IFIP SEC2007, Springer, New York 
pp. 467-472. 
Kumaraguru, P., Cranor, L., Lobo, J., Calo, S. (2007), ‘A Survey of Privacy Policy Lan-
guages’, SOUPS 2007, Pittsburgh, PA, USA. http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2007/work-
shop/Privacy_Policy_Languages.pdf. 
Lawrence, K., Kaler, C., Nadalin, A., Goodner, M., Gudgin, M., Barbir, A., Granqvist, H. 
(2008), WS-SecurityPolicy 1.3, OASIS Editor Draft 1. 
Lawrence, K., Kaler, C., Nadalin, A., Kaler, C., Monzillo, R., Hallam-Baker, P. (2006), Web 
Services Security: SOAP Message Security 1.1 (WS-Security 2004), OASIS Specification. 
Lessig, L. (1999), Code and other laws of cyberspace, Basic Books, New York. 
Maler, E. and Reed, D. (2008), ‘The Venn of Identity: Options and Issues in Federated 
Identity Management’, IEEE Security & Privacy 6, pp. 16-23.  
McGee, E. M., Maguire, G. Q. (2007), ‘Becoming borg to become immortal: regulating 
brain implant technologies,’ Camb Q Healthc Ethics 16 (3), pp. 291-302. 
Meints, M. and Hansen, M. (eds.) (2006), FIDIS Deliverable D3.6: Study on ID Documents, 
Download: http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp3-del3.6.study_on_ 
id_documents.pdf. 
Meints, M. and Hansen, M. (2008), ‘Der ePass—eine Sicherheits- und Datenschutzanalyse’, 
in: Proceedings of the Sicherheit 2008, 2-4 of April 2008 in Saarbrücken, Gesellschaft 
für Informatik, Bonn, pp. 31-43. 
Müller, G. and Wohlgemuth, S. (eds.) (2007), FIDIS Deliverable D14.2: Study on Privacy 
in Business Processes by Identity Management, Download: http://www.fidis.net/ 
fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp14-del14.2-
study_on_privacy_in_business_processes_by_identity_management.pdf. 
Müller, G and Wohlgemuth, S. (eds.) (2008), FIDIS Deliverable D14.3: Study on the Suit-
ability of Trusted Computing to support Privacy in Business Processes, Download: 
http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp14-del14.3_Study_on_the_Suit-
ability_of_Trusted_Computing_to_support_Privacy_in_Business_Processes.pdf. 
Nadalin, A., Goodner, M., Gudgin, M., Barbir, A., Granqvist, H. (2008), OASIS WS-Trust 
1.4, OASIS. 
Pettersson, J. S. and Meints, M. (eds.) (2009), FIDIS Deliverable D3.12: Study on Usability 
of Identity Management Systems, to appear March 2009. 
Pfitzmann, A. and Hansen, M., Anonymity, Unlinkability, Undetectability, Unobservability, 
Pseudonymity, and Identity Management, TU Dresden, Dresden, February 2008. 
http://dud.inf.tu-dresden.de/literatur/Anon_Terminology_v0.31.pdf. 
Pfitzmann, A. (2008), Security in IT Networks: Multilateral Security in Distributed and by 
Distributed Systems, TU Dresden, Dresden. http://dud.inf.tu-dresden.de/%7Epfitza/ 
SecCryptI_II.pdf 
Rannenberg, K., Pfitzmann, A., Müller, G. (1999), ‘IT Security and Multilateral Security’, 
in: Müller, G. and Rannenberg, K. (eds.): Multilateral Security in Communications, vol. 
3: Technology, Infrastructure, Economy, Addison-Wesley, München, pp. 21-29. 
Schneier, B. (1999), ‘Attack Trees’, Dr. Dobbs Journal. http://www.schneier.com/paper-
attacktrees-ddj-ft.html#rf7. 
4 High-Tech ID and Emerging Technologies 189 
 
Schreurs, W., Hildebrandt, M., Gasson, M., Warwick, K. (eds.) (2005), FIDIS Deliverable 
D7.3: Report on Actual and Possible Profiling Techniques in the Field of Ambient Intel-
ligence, Download: http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp7-del7.3. 
ami_profiling.pdf. 
Tanenbaum, A. S. (2003), Computer Networks, forth edition, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle 
River, NJ. 
Zhou, X., Kevenaar, T., Kelkboom, E., Busch, C., van der Veen, M., Nouak, A., (2007), 
‘Privacy Enhancing Technology for a 3D-Face Recognition System’, BIOSIG 2007: 
Biometrics and Electronic Signatures, pp. 3-14. http://www.3dface.org/files/papers/ 
zhou-CAST2007-TemplateProtection.pdf 
 
